Êzîdî in Germany: History, Communities and Present of the Largest Diaspora

Status: mid-2026. This article covers the Êzîdî community in Germany: migration history, centres, organisations, religious life, as well as law and politics. The worldwide distribution of the Êzîdî is covered in the article Diaspora and Demography; the genocide of 2014 in the articles Genocides against the Êzîdî, Fermane Chronicle and the Timeline. Methodology: All figures are given with sources; where figures diverge, ranges are stated. In quoted titles, campaign names and the names of public authorities, the original spelling (“Jesiden”) is retained.

Overview and Figures

Germany is home to by far the largest Êzîdî diaspora in the world, and, after Iraq, the country with the second-largest Êzîdî population overall [1][4]. What began in 1961 with a few recruited workers from Turkey has grown over three phases of migration into a community that shapes Êzîdî life in Europe, with its own community centres, burial grounds, umbrella organisations and growing public visibility.

There is no official figure: German statistics record citizenship, not religious affiliation. All figures are estimates with a considerable range [1]:

The credible range today is considered to be: an estimated 200,000 to 250,000 Êzîdî in Germany; older and conservative estimates start at around 100,000 [1][2][11]. The differences are explained by immigration after 2014, births in Germany and the method of counting, religiously practising persons or all people of Êzîdî origin [1][2]. By comparison, only about 65,000 Êzîdî live in the rest of Europe (details in the Diaspora article) [1][4].

Migration History: Three Phases

Phase 1: Guest Workers from Turkey (from 1961)

The first Êzîdî came to Germany under the German-Turkish recruitment agreement of 1961 as so-called “Gastarbeiter” (guest workers). A recruitment office in the province of Mardin also placed Êzîdî workers, among other places in Lower Saxony (Niedersachsen); they were employed above all at Volkswagen, at Telefunken and in the construction industry [4]. The first larger group migration is dated to early 1964 [1]. Thus, as early as the 1960s, the oldest Êzîdî settlement nucleus in Germany emerged: Celle, to which Êzîdî came mainly from the Batman/Beşiri region (in detail below) [5][6]. After the recruitment ban of 1973, women and children followed through family reunification, workers became families, families became communities.

Phase 2: Flight and Asylum (1980s and 1990s)

After the military coup in Turkey in 1980, the situation of the Êzîdî in south-eastern Turkey deteriorated dramatically: religious discrimination, land conflicts and the escalating Kurdish-Turkish conflict drove entire village communities from the Tur Abdin and the provinces of Batman and Mardin to flee to Germany [1][5].

Legally, this phase was accompanied by case law unique in Europe: in 1982, the Göttingen scholar of religion Gernot Wießner, with expert opinions before the Verwaltungsgericht Stade (administrative court of first instance), obtained the recognition of Êzîdî under asylum law [1]. The milestone followed in 1990: the Bundesverwaltungsgericht (BVerwG, Germany’s Federal Administrative Court, the highest court for administrative law) ruled in its judgment of 15 May 1990 (BVerwG 9 C 17.89) that the Êzîdî in south-eastern Turkey were subject to “indirect, regionally limited group persecution” on religious grounds [25]; in 1993, recognition became generally established through the case law of the OVG Lüneburg (Oberverwaltungsgericht, the Higher Administrative Court of Lower Saxony) [1].

The consequence: the Êzîdî population of Turkey emigrated almost completely. Today, only a few hundred to a few thousand Êzîdî remain there, the majority of “Turkish” Êzîdî live in Germany [1][5]. Only from about 2003, when the great asylum migration had long since concluded, did higher courts deny a continuing group persecution in Turkey [26].

In parallel, Syrian Êzîdî arrived in the 1980s; Iraqi Êzîdî fled from the Baath regime (including the Anfal campaign) and increasingly after the Iraq War of 2003 [1].

Phase 3: Flight from Genocide from 2014

On 3 August 2014, the so-called “Islamic State” (IS) attacked the main Êzîdî settlement area of Şingal: more than 5,000 Êzîdî were killed, around 7,000 abducted, women and girls enslaved, boys forcibly recruited as child soldiers, and about 400,000 people displaced; studies cite partly diverging figures [3][10]. This Ferman (covered in detail in the Genocide article and in the Fermane Chronicle) triggered the largest Êzîdî flight movement to Germany to date; together with the Syrian war from 2011 onwards, it caused the number of Êzîdî in Germany to rise significantly [1][2].

The Special Admission Quotas (Sonderkontingente) of 2015/16

A response to the genocide that attracted worldwide attention came from Baden-Württemberg: from 2015, the federal state took in, under a Sonderkontingent (a special humanitarian admission quota outside the regular asylum system), around 1,000 to 1,100 severely traumatised, predominantly Êzîdî women and children from northern Iraq, among them also some Christian women and boys. In January 2015, the state government commissioned the German-Êzîdî psychologist Prof. Jan Ilhan Kizilhan to assess and select those affected in Iraq; the mission initially ran in secret. Those admitted were distributed across more than 20 towns and municipalities [12][13][14][15].

In addition, Niedersachsen (Lower Saxony) took in around 70 and Schleswig-Holstein around 30 women; Brandenburg also participated with a small group [14]. Other federal states, including Nordrhein-Westfalen (North Rhine-Westphalia), admitted Êzîdî through the regular asylum and federal procedures, but did not set up a special quota of this kind of their own [14]. The programme is regarded as a model case; the training of Iraqi psychotherapists also goes back to Kizilhan [12][13].

Centres and Communities

The Êzîdî population is concentrated in two major regions: Niedersachsen (Lower Saxony) and northern Nordrhein-Westfalen (North Rhine-Westphalia). Larger communities exist, among others, in Celle, Hannover, Oldenburg, Bad Zwischenahn and Wilhelmshaven, in Bielefeld/Ostwestfalen-Lippe, on the Lower Rhine (Kalkar, Kleve, Rees, Emmerich, Wesel) and in Köln (Cologne); furthermore in Gießen, Frankfurt, Berlin, Bremen, in the Saarland and in southern Germany [1][5].

Celle: Germany’s Oldest Community

Celle is regarded as the oldest Êzîdî community in Germany: the first Êzîdî came in the 1960s as guest workers from the Batman/Beşiri region. About 90 per cent of the people of Turkish origin living in Celle since 1965 are of Êzîdî descent [5][6].

Today, according to more recent figures, around 7,000 to 10,000 Êzîdî live in the city and district of Celle (older sources cited about 5,000) [4][6]. Measured by share of the population, Celle is thus the densest Êzîdî settlement area in Germany and one of the largest Êzîdî communities worldwide: some sources even speak of the largest community outside Şingal; such superlatives, however, depend on how one counts [4][6]. The Êzîdî cultural centre (Mala Êzdiyan Celle) has existed as an association since the early 1990s; its own building was purchased in 2002 and opened in 2005 [6].

Bielefeld and Ostwestfalen-Lippe

About 6,000 Êzîdî live in Bielefeld; together with Herford, Minden and Halle (Westf.), Ostwestfalen-Lippe forms the second large settlement area [20]. Bielefeld is at the same time the organisational centre of the community: it was here, in the town hall, that the Zentralrat der Êzîden (Central Council of the Êzîdî) was founded in 2017; the Ezidische Gemeinde OWL e.V. is based here; and an Êzîdî burial ground has existed since 1994 [1][16][17][20].

Oldenburg

Oldenburg is the seat of the Yezidisches Forum e.V., one of the oldest and most active community organisations in Germany (educational and dialogue work since the 1990s); the Êzîdî burial ground Oldenburg-Kreyenbrück has existed since 1994 [1][21]. The magazine “Dengê Êzîdiyan”, one of the first regular Êzîdî publications in Europe, was also published here [1].

Hannover

The Hannover region is home to one of the largest Êzîdî populations in Germany and the largest Êzîdî burial ground in the country: Êzîdî have been buried at the Lahe municipal cemetery since 1990, by now around 200 graves [1][4]. At New Year celebrations in rented halls, up to 5,000 guests attended at times (2015); for a long time, however, the city itself lacked a community centre of its own [1][4].

Organisations and Self-Representation

Since the 1990s, a diverse landscape of associations has emerged, from local cultural centres to nationwide umbrella organisations:

• Zentralrat der Êzîden in Deutschland (ZÊD, Central Council of the Êzîdî in Germany): founded on 29 January 2017 in Bielefeld town hall by 29 associations, communities and organisations, among them the older “Zentralrat der Yeziden in Deutschland” (2007) and the GEA. First chairman: the political scientist Irfan Ortac (around 70 per cent in the first ballot). For the first time, the ZÊD united around 80 per cent of the organised associations; its seat is Bielefeld [16][17][18].
• Ezidische Akademie e.V. (Hannover, founded 2009): educational, cultural and research work [1].
• Gesellschaft Ezidischer AkademikerInnen (GEA, Society of Êzîdî Academics) (Essen, founded 2012): by its own account the world’s largest Êzîdî academic association [1][22].
• Êzîdische Jugend Deutschland e.V. (ÊJD, Êzîdî Youth Germany): emerged at the end of 2017 from the “Ezidische Jugend e.V.” founded in the Saarland in 2011; nationwide youth umbrella organisation (identity, integration, transmission of culture and religion) [19].
• HÁWAR.help (Berlin): human rights organisation of the German-Êzîdî journalist Düzen Tekkal, founded in response to the genocide of 2014; has run women’s centres in northern Iraq since 2018, produced documentary films (“Háwar”, “Jiyan”, “Bêmal”) and initiated the campaign #JesidenBleiben for a nationwide deportation freeze [23][24].
• Mala Êzîdîya (“House of the Êzîdî”): network of local community and cultural centres, among others in Celle, Wesel (association 1995, own building 2008), Emmerich, Bremen, Bielefeld, Berlin, Bonn, Gießen and Freiburg; many are ZÊD member associations [16][21].
• An older umbrella structure was the Föderation der Êzîdîschen Vereine (Federation of Êzîdî Associations, 15+ member associations) [1].

Portraits of Düzen Tekkal, Irfan Ortac, Jan Ilhan Kizilhan and other personalities can be found in the article Notable Personalities.

Religious Life in Germany

Laliş Remains the Centre

There are no Êzîdî temples in the strict sense in Germany: the religious centre remains Laliş in northern Iraq with the sanctuary of Şêx Adî, the most important holy site and the central place of pilgrimage of the Êzîdî. Many make the pilgrimage there or maintain the connection symbolically, for instance through consecrated earth from Laliş (berat) or water from the holy spring Kanîya Spî [1][21][28]. Locally, Mala Êzîdîya and cultural centres take on the community functions: festivals, religious instruction, interreligious dialogue, the ritual washing of the deceased, educational work [1][21][28]. For certain ceremonies, clergy (Qewals) sometimes travel specially from Iraq [1].

Festivals

The most important festival of the year is Çarşema Sor, also Çarşema Serê Nîsanê, the New Year festival on the first Wednesday of April in the Julian-based Êzîdî calendar (in the Gregorian calendar usually the second or third Wednesday of April). In Germany it is celebrated in community centres, rented festival halls and as family picnics; the customs include dyed eggs, flowers above the front door and the Bazimbar ribbons [4][27][28][29]. In addition, the communities observe Cejna Êzîd (the December festival following the fasting days) and Tawisgeran occasions [4][28]; state politics and municipalities are increasingly taking note of the festivals [29].

Burial Culture

Since repatriating the deceased to the homeland is often not possible, separate Êzîdî burial grounds have been established since 1990: first Wesel, Emmerich and Hannover-Lahe (all 1990; Lahe, with around 200 graves, the largest), in 1994 Bielefeld and Oldenburg-Kreyenbrück, later among others Bochum, Goch, Minden and Herford (2019) [1][4]. The main motif of the gravestones is the sun symbol [1][4].

Religious Structure in the Diaspora

The traditional estate system of the Êzîdî (Şêx, Pîr, Mirîd) and the endogamy associated with it persist in Germany as well, but are increasingly being debated, especially by the young generation [1][11].

Law and Politics

The Genocide Recognition by the Bundestag (19 January 2023)

On 19 January 2023, the Deutscher Bundestag (the German federal parliament) recognised the IS crimes against the Êzîdî of 2014 as genocide within the meaning of the UN Genocide Convention. The motion “Anerkennung und Gedenken an den Völkermord an den Êzîdinnen und Êzîden 2014” (Drucksache 20/5228: a “Drucksache” is an official numbered parliamentary paper), introduced by the SPD, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, FDP and CDU/CSU parliamentary groups, was adopted unanimously: AfD and Linke also voted in favour, while voicing criticism of details in the debate [7][8][9].

In the motion, the Bundestag committed itself to consistent criminal prosecution under the principle of universal jurisdiction, to strengthening international evidence preservation (UNITAD, Eurojust), to supporting reconstruction in Şingal and the return of around 300,000 internally displaced persons, to demands on Iraq (ICC Statute, a criminal offence of genocide), and expressly to granting Êzîdî protection in asylum proceedings “in consideration of their ongoing persecution” [7][8]. This had been preceded by a hearing in the Human Rights Committee (June 2022), in which experts such as Düzen Tekkal recommended recognition, and by a petition from the community [30][23].

Criminal Trials: Germany as Pioneer of Universal Jurisdiction

German courts were the first in the world to prosecute the genocide against the Êzîdî under criminal law:

• OLG Frankfurt (Oberlandesgericht, Higher Regional Court), 30 November 2021, Taha Al-J.: the world’s first criminal judgment for genocide against the Êzîdî and the first genocide verdict against an IS member at all: life imprisonment: among other counts for genocide, crimes against humanity resulting in death, and war crimes. In 2015, the Iraqi had bought an Êzîdî woman and her five-year-old daughter as slaves; he left the child chained up in the blazing sun to die of thirst. Amnesty International described the judgment as historic [10][31].
• OLG München (Higher Regional Court of Munich), Jennifer W.: the IS returnee from Lower Saxony, wife of Taha Al-J., was initially sentenced in October 2021 to ten years’ imprisonment (among other counts for aiding and abetting attempted murder by omission, and IS membership). After an appeal by the Federal Public Prosecutor (Bundesanwaltschaft) and partial reversal by the BGH (Bundesgerichtshof, Germany’s Federal Court of Justice), a sentence of 14 years’ imprisonment followed in August 2023 for enslavement resulting in death as a crime against humanity [32][33][34].

Further proceedings followed before several higher regional courts; Germany is thus regarded as the international pioneer in the judicial reckoning with the Ferman under the German Code of Crimes against International Law (Völkerstrafgesetzbuch) [10][31].

The Deportation Debate (Status: Mid-2026)

The deportation practice stands in tension with the genocide recognition. From 2023, people were again deported to Iraq, 135 persons in total in 2023, among them also Êzîdî; the protection rate for Iraqi Êzîdî in asylum proceedings fell to about 53 per cent in 2023. Critics counter that the Bundestag expressly promised protection in 2023 [35].

Refugee councils (including that of Lower Saxony), HÁWAR.help with the campaign #JesidenBleiben, Pro Asyl and Wadi demand a deportation freeze or a right to remain. An expert report produced in 2024 for, among others, Pro Asyl (“Zehn Jahre nach dem Völkermord”) denies that safe return prospects exist: Şingal is largely destroyed, hundreds of thousands continue to live in camps, and militia presence and air strikes keep the situation volatile [24][36][37]. The opposing position: several federal states and parts of the domestic policy establishment consider deportations possible, particularly to central Iraq. At the beginning of 2026, initiatives for a secured right of residence for Êzîdî were again negotiated in the Bundestag’s Committee on Internal Affairs; the debate remains open [35][38].

Identity and the Young Generation

A survey of more than 500 Êzîdî in Germany presented in 2025 shows a twofold effect of the 2014 genocide: since then, Êzîdî have engaged considerably more intensively with their own history, religion and culture, at the same time, depression, anxiety and trauma scores are significantly elevated; the Ferman is identity-forming and burdensome at once [11]. Among those who fled after 2014 are many survivors of enslavement and sexualised violence as well as relatives of the murdered; transgenerational transmission of trauma has been empirically described, while psychotherapy services in the mother tongue remain scarce [11][12][13].

Young Êzîdî born in Germany identify strongly with the country in which they grew up; traditional norms such as endogamy and the estate system are being questioned. Cultural associations and the ÊJD try to connect religious identity and the realities of life in Germany, through youth work, seminars and social media [11][19]. On the tenth anniversary of the genocide in 2024, the ZÊD demanded, beyond political recognition, cultural anchoring: a memorial site, educational programmes and university programmes on the Êzîdî religion [1].

Identity debates and generational questions will be treated in a separate, in-depth article.

Sources

1. Wikipedia: „Jesiden in Deutschland", https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jesiden_in_Deutschland
2. ÊzîdîPress: „Zahl der Êzîden in Deutschland steigt auf über 200.000", https://www.ezidipress.com/blog/zahl-der-eziden-in-deutschland-steigt-auf-ueber-200-000/
3. bpb: „2014: Völkermord an Jesidinnen und Jesiden", https://www.bpb.de/kurz-knapp/hintergrund-aktuell/550977/2014-voelkermord-an-jesidinnen-und-jesiden/
4. Haus der Religionen Hannover: „Eziden in Hannover: Geschichte und Gegenwart", https://haus-der-religionen.de/de/religionen/eziden/eziden-in-hannover-geschichte-und-gegenwart
5. taz: „Jesiden in Norddeutschland: Die zweite Heimat", https://taz.de/Jesiden-in-Norddeutschland/!5035368/
6. Celler Presse (2024): Vortrag Andreas Flick über den êzîdîschen Glauben, https://celler-presse.de/2024/05/02/theologe-andreas-flick-informiert-ueber-den-ezidischen-glauben-beim-frauenfruehstueck-des-sovd-ortsverbandes-nienhagen/
7. Deutscher Bundestag: „Bundestag erkennt IS-Verbrechen an Jesiden als Völkermord an" (19.01.2023, Drs. 20/5228), https://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2023/kw03-de-jesiden-927032
8. Deutscher Bundestag, hib: „Anerkennung des Völkermordes an Jesiden", https://www.bundestag.de/presse/hib/kurzmeldungen-929880
9. HÁWAR.help: „Deutscher Bundestag erkennt den Völkermord an den Jesiden offiziell an", https://www.hawar.help/de/anerkennung-genozid-bundestag/
10. Amnesty International (30.11.2021): „Weltweit erstes Urteil wegen Völkermordes an Jesid_innen", https://www.amnesty.de/allgemein/pressemitteilung/deutschland-weltweit-erstes-urteil-wegen-voelkermordes-jesidinnen
11. Vatican News (04/2025): „Die Jesiden – integriert, verunsichert, traumatisiert?", https://www.vaticannews.va/de/kirche/news/2025-04/jesiden-deutschland-irak-religion-genozid-kultur-glaube-is.html
12. Schwäbische Zeitung: „Würdigung eines Seelenretters: Kizilhan hat Tausenden Jesidinnen geholfen", https://www.schwaebische.de/politik/wuerdigung-eines-seelenretters-kizilhan-hat-tausenden-jesidinnen-geholfen-3426547
13. DHBW: „Prof. Dr. Dr. Jan Ilhan Kizilhan erhält Landesverdienstorden", https://www.dhbw.de/die-dhbw/aktuelles/detail/2016/4/prof-dr-dr-jan-ilhan-kizilhan-erhaelt-landesverdienstorden
14. Kontext-Wochenzeitung: „Sonderkontingent Jesidinnen", https://www.kontextwochenzeitung.de/politik/623/eine-unertraegliche-situation-8740.html
15. Baden-Württemberg.de: „‚Wir können wieder leben’ – Jesidinnen und ihr Leben im Südwesten", https://www.baden-wuerttemberg.de/de/service/alle-meldungen/meldung/pid/wir-koennen-wieder-leben-jesidinnen-und-ihr-leben-im-suedwesten/
16. Zentralrat der Êzîden: Über uns / Verbandsgeschichte / Mitgliedsvereine, https://zentralrat-eziden.com/uber-uns
17. ÊzîdîPress: „Bielefeld: ‚Zentralrat der Êzîden in Deutschland’ gegründet", https://www.ezidipress.com/blog/bielefeld-zentralrat-der-eziden-in-deutschland-gegruendet/
18. Wikipedia: „Zentralrat der Êzîden in Deutschland", https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zentralrat_der_Êzîden_in_Deutschland
19. Êzîdische Jugend Deutschland e.V. (ÊJD), https://ezidischejugend.com/
20. Neue Westfälische: „Neue Heimat für die Jesiden", https://www.nw.de/lokal/bielefeld/mitte/4167521_Neue-Heimat-fuer-die-Jesiden.html
21. Ezidisches Kulturzentrum Wesel e.V. (Mala Êzidîya Wesel), https://eziden-wesel.de/
22. GEA, Gesellschaft Ezidischer AkademikerInnen: „Gemeinden und Organisationen der Eziden", https://www.gea-ev.net/eziden-und-ezidentum/gemeinden-organisationen/
23. HÁWAR.help: Über uns / Düzen Tekkal, https://www.hawar.help/de/
24. HÁWAR.help: Kampagne #JesidenBleiben / Offener Brief an das BMI, https://www.hawar.help/de/offener-brief-nancy-faeser-abschiebestopp-jesiden/
25. BVerwG, Urteil vom 15.05.1990, 9 C 17.89 (via Refworld), https://www.refworld.org/country,DEU_BUNDESVERWALT,deu,3ae6b73324,0.html
26. OVG Niedersachsen, 17.07.2007, 11 LB 332/03, https://voris.wolterskluwer-online.de/browse/document/970117b1-494b-4c6c-978e-0283495c6732
27. SJA, Stelle für Jesidische Angelegenheiten: „Eyda Çarşema Serê Nîsanê", https://s-j-a.org/blog/neujahresfest/
28. Wikipedia: „Jesidisches Neujahrsfest", https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jesidisches_Neujahrsfest
29. Migrationsbeauftragte Niedersachsen: Glückwunsch zum Neujahrsfest (2022), https://www.migrationsbeauftragter-niedersachsen.de/2022/04/20/cejna-sare-sale-landesbeauftragte-gratuliert-jesidinnen-und-jesiden-zum-neujahrsfest/
30. Deutscher Bundestag: „Sachverständige empfehlen Anerkennung des Völkermordes an Jesiden" (06/2022), https://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2022/kw25-pa-menschenrechte-880198
31. ICWC, Universität Marburg: „Urteil des OLG Frankfurt im Strafverfahren gegen Taha Al-J.", https://www.uni-marburg.de/de/icwc/aktuelles/nachrichten/urteil-des-olg-frankfurt-im-strafverfahren-gegen-tahar-al-j
32. LTO: „OLG München: Zehn Jahre Haft für IS-Rückkehrerin" (2021), https://www.lto.de/recht/nachrichten/n/olg-muenchen-8-st-9-18-is-rueckkehrerin-jennifer-w-haftstrafe-terroristische-vereinigung-beihilfe-mord
33. LTO: „OLG München: 14 Jahre Haft für IS-Rückkehrerin" (2023), https://www.lto.de/recht/nachrichten/n/olg-muenchen-haftstrafe-islamischer-staat-irak-versklavung-todesfolge-jesiden
34. Euronews (29.08.2023): Urteil gegen Jennifer W. in München, https://de.euronews.com/2023/08/29/jesidisches-madchen-5-im-irak-verdurstet-urteil-gegen-32-jahrige-in-munchen
35. Deutscher Bundestag, hib: „Kritik an Abschiebungen von Jesiden in den Irak", https://www.bundestag.de/presse/hib/kurzmeldungen-978206
36. Flüchtlingsrat Niedersachsen: Offener Brief zu Abschiebungen von Êzîdî, https://www.nds-fluerat.org/59549/aktuelles/offener-brief-an-die-innenministerinnen-im-rahmen-der-imk-die-unterschiedslose-abschiebung-von-jesiden-pruefen-und-beenden/
37. Pro Asyl / Wadi (2024): „Zehn Jahre nach dem Völkermord: Zur Lage der Jesidinnen und Jesiden im Irak", https://www.proasyl.de/wp-content/uploads/2024_04_23_Zur-Lage-der-Jesidinnen-und-Jesiden-im-Irak.pdf
38. Deutscher Bundestag (2026): „Vorstöße zum Aufenthaltsrecht für Jesiden", https://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2026/kw09-pa-inneres-jesiden-1146374

The Asylum-Policy Paradox: Recognition and Deportation at the Same Time

The tension between the unanimous genocide recognition of 2023 and the residency practice has since intensified rather than dissolved, a contradiction that advocacy groups for those affected describe as “recognition with one hand, deportation with the other.” Several lines of development converge here:

• Removal of obstacles to deportation: Until 2023/24, de facto deportation moratoriums and a restrictive return practice protected most Iraqi Êzîdî from deportation. Since April 2024, deportations to Iraq have again been possible even for persons without prior criminal convictions; accordingly, the total number of deportations to Iraq rose from 27 (2020) to 699 in 2024 [37][39].
• Declining protection rate: The recognition rate for Iraqi Êzîdî in the asylum procedure fell from over 90 percent (2017) to just under 49 percent (2022) and around 53 percent (2023), down to only about 37 percent (2025); for Syrian Êzîdî it stood at around 66 percent in 2025 [37][39].
• Revocation of already-granted protection statuses: The BAMF also initiated revocation and withdrawal proceedings against previously recognized Êzîdî. From 2015 to August 2023, the protection status of over 1,500 Iraqi Êzîdî was revoked; in numerous cases administrative courts later overturned the revocation (in the sample cited by Pro Asyl, 41 out of 41 contested) [37][39].
• Scale of those affected: Since the BAMF does not record Êzîdî separately from other Iraqi nationals, there is no official figure; Pro Asyl estimates that currently around 5,000 to 10,000 Iraqi Êzîdî are required to leave the country and thus threatened with deportation [37][39].

At the Conference of Interior Ministers (IMK), Pro Asyl, the Refugee Council of Lower Saxony, and HÁWAR.help repeatedly called for a nationwide deportation moratorium as well as a right-to-stay regulation under Section 23 (1) of the Residence Act (admission on grounds of international law and humanitarian considerations). They base the special need for protection precisely on the long-term consequences of the genocide recognized in 2023; however, a cross-state IMK resolution to this effect did not come about by mid-2026 [36][40][41]. In the Bundestag, the Interior Committee continued its deliberations on a secured right of residence in 2026, including a hearing of expert witnesses [38][42].