Êzîdî Migration Routes and Diaspora History: Global Research

Date: 2026-05-22 Assignment: Historical migration routes of the Êzîdî since the 19th century, with a focus on the 73–74 Fermane (genocide events) and their impact on the formation of the diaspora Status: Research report Companion document: research-ezdiki-diaspora-demographie.md (population statistics per country)

Methodological preface:

1. “Ferman” (plural “Fermane”) derives from the Persian farmān (“religious decree / order”). In the Êzîdî tradition the word is synonymous with any genocidal assault by ruling powers (Ottomans, local emirs, later ISIS).
2. The number 73 (or 74) is in part symbolic, in the sense of “very many.” Only a portion of the Fermane is documented in historical detail; the rest live on in the oral tradition.
3. Most important consensus list: The two most recent Fermane are clearly identified: 73rd = Qahtaniyah bombings 2007, 74th = ISIS Sinjar genocide 2014. Some Êzîdî sources also count the ISIS genocide as the 73rd (when Qahtaniyah is not counted separately).
4. The dating of individual Fermane is sometimes uncertain (Ottoman sources + oral tradition blend together). Where contradictory, the academically substantiated value is given.

Table of Contents

1. Geographic core region before the Fermane
2. The 73–74 Fermane in historical overview
3. Migration wave 1: 1828–1832 → Russian Armenia
4. Migration wave 2: 1877–1894 → Caucasus + Armenian Soviet
5. Migration wave 3: 1915–1918 → Transcaucasia (WWI / Armenian genocide)
6. Migration wave 4: 1962–1980 → Syria exception, Soviet consolidation
7. Migration wave 5: 1964–1990 → Guest workers Turkey → Germany
8. Migration wave 6: 1991–2002 → Post-Soviet Armenia/Georgia → Russia + DE
9. Migration wave 7: 2003–2013 → Iraq War migration
10. Migration wave 8: 2014–2019 → Sinjar genocide (MAIN WAVE)
11. Migration wave 9: 2018–2024 → Afrin displacement
12. Maps, textual description
13. Lincoln, Nebraska special case
14. Migration waves summary table
15. Source index

1. Geographic core region before the Fermane

Before the onset of the forcibly compelled migratory movements, the Êzîdî settled in a contiguous geographic core region that may be designated as “Êzîdistan” or the “Êzîdî heartland”:

Core region (present-day state borders):

• Northwest Iraq: Sinjar (Şingal), Sheikhan (Şêxan), Lalîş, Ba’şiqa/Behzanî
• Southeast Turkey: Tur Abdîn (Mardin), Şırnak, Diyarbakır, Şanlıurfa, Batman, Bitlis, Van
• Northeast Syria: Afrin (Çiyayê Kurmênc), Hasaka (Cizîrê)
• Northwest Iran: Khoy, Urmia, Salmas, Maku
• Southeast Turkey (Ottoman Empire): Kars, Bazîd, Surmalu (today the Igdir region)

Population estimate ca. 1800: 500,000–700,000 Êzîdî (before the series of Ottoman Fermane)

Sacred geography:

• Lalîş as the spiritual center (Tomb of Şêx Adî)
• Mount Sinjar (Çiyayê Şingal) as a physical and spiritual anchor
• Mount Aragats (Êlegez) later became (post-1828) the second sacred mountain of the diaspora

2. The 73–74 Fermane in historical overview

This list combines the academically documented Fermane (cf. Murad Ismael & Yousif Kalian, “The Yazidi Firmans” 2019; Eppel, “Genocidal Campaigns during the Ottoman Era” 2019; Cetorelli/Sasson, PLOS Medicine 2017):

Important: Not all 73–74 Fermane are documented in detail. The Êzîdî folk tradition counts 72 Fermane before Qahtaniyah (2007); some count Qahtaniyah and ISIS together as the 73rd/74th.

3. Migration wave 1: 1828–1832 → Russian Armenia

Trigger

• The Russo-Persian War of 1826–28 and the subsequent Russo-Turkish War of 1828–29 forced the Ottoman Empire to cede territories to Russia (Treaty of Adrianople 1829).
• Êzîdî in the contested border regions (Bazîd, Surmalu, Igdir, Van) were caught between the front lines.
• In parallel: local emirs (Bedirkhan, Mîrê Kore) launch the Firmana Mîrê Kore (1832–34) with 70,000–135,000 dead in Sheikhan + Sinjar.

Route

SINJAR (Iraq) / SHEIKHAN → Bazîd (eastern Turkey) → Russian-occupied Armenia

Specifically: Êzîdî moved northward along the Tigris–Euphrates watershed region, then over the mountains into Surmalu (today the Igdir region, Turkey) and across into the Russian-occupied provinces of Yerevan, Etchmiadzin, and the Sevan region.

Main destination villages (first foundations in Armenia 1828)

• Sipan (formerly Pampa Kurda/Kurmanca), founded 1828 by Êzîdî, in Aragatsotn province (renamed Sipan in the 1970s)
• Rya Taza (“The new way”), Êzîdî village
• Alagyaz / Êlegez on the slopes of Mount Aragats (northern slope)
• Aparan and surrounding villages
• Talin and surrounding villages

Result

• For the first time, a substantial Êzîdî diaspora became established outside the core region.
• The Russian Empire treated the Êzîdî tolerantly (in contrast to the Ottoman Empire) and guaranteed limited religious autonomy.
• The Êzîdî were armed and deployed as a “reliable minority against Muslim tribes”, the beginning of Êzîdî loyalty to the Russian state.

Sources

• Pizzoferrato, “Yazidi Community of Armenia”: anthonypizzoferrato.com [Trust 6]
• armeniantraveldirectory.com, “Yazidi Community of Armenia” [Trust 6]
• Wikipedia EN, “Yazidis in Armenia” [Trust 7]

4. Migration wave 2: 1877–1894 → Caucasus

Trigger

• The Russo-Turkish War of 1877–78 under Tsar Alexander II, Russia gains further territories (Kars, Ardahan, Batum).
• Sultan Abdulhamid II begins, from the 1880s, a targeted pan-Islamization policy directed against Christians AND Êzîdî.
• Hamidiye regiments (founded 1891): armed Kurdish-Sunni militias, attack Êzîdî villages in Tur Abdîn + Sinjar.
• 1892: Demand for forced conversion by Faruk Pasha under the Hamidiye; Êzîdî pilgrimage ban to Lalîş.

Route

Tur Abdîn (Mardin/Batman) + Sinjar → Bazîd/Surmalu → Russian Kars / Ardahan → Aparan + new villages in Armenia

Secondary wave from Ayntap (Gaziantep): Tekor (Kars), Surmalu, Aparan, Etchmiadzin, Armavir, Ashtarak.

Result

• Doubling of the Êzîdî population in Armenia.
• Êzîdî in Kars province remained until the 1920s, then, through the Turkish-Russian Treaty of 1921 (Treaty of Kars) → migration to Soviet Armenia.

5. Migration wave 3: 1915–1918 → Transcaucasia (WWI / Armenian genocide)

Trigger

• The First World War 1914–18 and, simultaneously, the Armenian genocide of 1915. The Ottoman Empire begins massacres of Armenians, Assyrians AND Êzîdî (all non-Muslims defined as enemies).
• Êzîdî from Van, Kars, Bazîd, and Mardin fled together with their Armenian neighbors.

Route

Van + Mardin + Bazîd → Yerevan + Tiflis (Tbilisi)

This wave was numerically the largest before 2014. Estimates speak of 50,000–100,000 Êzîdî who fled to Transcaucasia between 1915 and 1920.

Result

• The Russian Empire collapsed in 1917; the Êzîdî ended up in the new Soviet republics of Armenia + Georgia.
• 1919: The Yezidi National Council Tbilisi is registered (the first formal Êzîdî organization outside Iraq).
• Soviet policy under Stalin: the Êzîdî are recognized as a separate nationality (unlike “Kurds,” who were regarded as problematic).

Source

• Wikipedia EN, “Yazidis,” WWI section [Trust 6]
• Açıkyıldız, “The Yezidis: The History of a Community” [Trust 9]

6. Migration wave 4: 1962–1980 → Syria exception + Soviet consolidation

Trigger in Syria

• Syrian census 1962: Denies ~120,000 Kurds + Êzîdî Syrian citizenship → they become “Ajanib” (foreigners) or “Maktoumin” (the concealed = not registered).
• Êzîdî in Afrin + Hasaka effectively stateless: no voting rights, no property, no travel documents.
• Ba’ath regime from 1963: Arabization policy in the “Jazira” region; Êzîdî villages expropriated.

Trigger in the Soviet sphere (consolidation)

• Soviet Êzîdî well established. In 1946 Heciyê Cindî creates the Cindî Cyrillic alphabet for Kurmancî Êzîdîkî.
• Êzîdî Academy of Sciences in Yerevan from 1959.
• Newspaper “Riya Teze” (1930–2003): up to 4,800 issues.

Result

• Syrian Êzîdî begin emigrating to Germany from the mid-1970s.
• Soviet Êzîdî consolidate academically and politically (Kurdoev, Bakaev, Casimê Celîl, Ordîxanê Celîl, Celîlê Celîl).

7. Migration wave 5: 1964–1990 → Guest workers Turkey → Germany

Trigger

• Recruitment agreement Turkey–Germany 1961 (in effect from 1964).
• Young Êzîdî from Mardin/Batman/Tur Abdîn enlist as “Turkish guest workers.”
• Telefunken plant Celle 1966: Êzîdî cluster in Celle.
• Turkish military coup of 1980 under General Kenan Evren → 2nd wave as political refugees.
• Federal Constitutional Court ruling of 30 June 1992 (ref. 2 BvR 1968/91): Êzîdî from Turkey are “persecuted as a group”, full right to asylum.

Route

Mardin / Batman / Tur Abdîn → Istanbul → rail to Germany → Celle / Hannover / Bielefeld

Important stages

• 1964–1973: Guest workers (young men)
• 1973–1980: Family reunification (recruitment halt 1973)
• 1980–1992: Political refugees
• 1992+: Recognized asylum seekers

Result

• The Turkish Êzîdî population fell from ~80,000 (1950) to <500 (today).
• The German Êzîdî population grew to ~80,000–100,000 before 2014.
• Celle became the “Êzîdî capital of Germany” relative to the city’s size.

Source

• Wikipedia DE, “Jesiden in Deutschland” [Trust 8]
• Federal Constitutional Court ref. 2 BvR 1968/91 [Trust 10]
• Cambridge Nationalities Papers, “Selective Humanitarianism” [Trust 9]

8. Migration wave 6: 1991–2002 → Post-Soviet Armenia/Georgia → Russia + DE

Trigger

• Soviet collapse 1991: Armenia + Georgia economically destabilized.
• Energy crisis in Armenia 1992–95: Êzîdî in the mountain villages of Aragats particularly affected.
• Nagorno-Karabakh War 1992–94: Êzîdî caught under pressure between Azerbaijan + Armenia.

Route A: Economic migration to Russia

Aragatsotn (Armenia) + Tbilisi (Georgia) → Krasnodar Krai + Stavropol Krai + Nizhny Novgorod

Route B: Emigration to Germany

Yerevan + Tbilisi → Moscow → Berlin → Hannover / Bielefeld

Result

• The Georgian Êzîdî population fell from 33,331 (1989) to 12,174 (2014), -65%.
• The Armenian Êzîdî population fell from 52,700 (1989) to 31,079 (2022), -41%.
• Russia’s Êzîdî grew officially from ~10,000 (1990) to 40,586 (2010 census); NGOs speak of 80,000–200,000.
• Germany additionally received ~15,000–20,000 post-Soviet Êzîdî.

9. Migration wave 7: 2003–2013 → Iraq War migration

Trigger

• 2nd Iraq War 2003: Overthrow of Saddam Hussein.
• Post-Saddam vacuum: Salafist groups (Al-Qaeda Iraq, the precursor of ISIS) attack minorities.
• 14–15 August 2007 Qahtaniyah bombings (FERMAN NO. 73): 4 truck bombs in Til Ezêr + Siba Sheikh Khidir (Sinjar district), ~500 (initial reports) up to 796 (final count) dead, over 1,500 injured. Up to that point the worst terrorist attack after 9/11.
• 2007+: Mosul bus hijacking, 23 Êzîdî students of the University of Mosul murdered.

Route

Sinjar / Sheikhan → Turkey → Germany / Sweden / Netherlands

First wave of Sinjar Êzîdî in Europe. Previously, the Êzîdî in Germany had been primarily Turkish.

Result

• ~10,000–20,000 Iraqi Êzîdî came to Europe in 2007–2013.
• Lincoln, Nebraska, USA: growth through 2nd Gulf War refugees (UN Refugee Program).

10. Migration wave 8: 2014–2019 → Sinjar genocide (MAIN WAVE)

Trigger

• 3 August 2014: ISIS overruns the city of Sinjar + its hinterland (Çiyayê Şingal). Kurdish Peshmerga withdraw.
• 3–15 August 2014: Massacre and mass enslavement. Roughly 3,100 Êzîdî killed (PLOS Medicine 2017: 2,100–4,400; other estimates up to ~5,000), about 6,800 women and children enslaved (4,200–10,800), ~400,000 displaced.
• 30,000–50,000 Êzîdî trapped on Mount Sinjar for days without water in the heat.
• PKK–YPG corridor (12–13 August): PKK + YPG fighters open a corridor through Syria (Rojava) for Êzîdî refugees into northern Iraq.
• 15 August 2014 Kocho massacre: The entire male population (~400 men) executed; ~1,000 women + children abducted.

Route A: Primary flight (August 2014)

Sinjar → Mount Sinjar (Çiyayê Şingal) → PKK corridor through Rojava (Syria) → Faysh Khabur (Turkish border) → Dohuk + Zakho (Kurdistan Region of Iraq) → IDP camps (Khanke, Sharya, Essian, Kabarto, Bajed Kandala)

Route B: Secondary flight to Europe (2014–2019, main “Balkan” route)

IDP camp in Kurdistan → Turkey (illegal border crossing in southern Turkey) → smuggler boat across the Aegean → Lesbos/Chios/Kos (Greece) → Macedonia → Serbia → Hungary (until the border closure in Sept. 2015) or Croatia → Slovenia → Austria → Germany

Variant: Turkey → Bulgaria → Romania → Hungary → Austria → DE

Main destinations: Germany, Sweden, Netherlands, Belgium, France.

Route C: Regular resettlement

• Special programs:
• Baden-Württemberg “Special Quota” 2015: 1,100 Êzîdî women survivors; initiated by Jan İlhan Kızılhan + Düzen Tekkal.
• France program 2016: smaller number
• Australia Special Humanitarian Programme: 3,121 Êzîdî to NSW (2014–2024).
• Canada “Survivors of Daesh” 2017: 1,215 (81% Êzîdî) to Winnipeg/Toronto.
• USA SIV + UNHCR resettlement: primarily to Lincoln, NE.

Result

• ~75,000 Êzîdî moved to Germany in 2015–2019 (BAMF data).
• Germany became the largest Êzîdî diaspora worldwide (~250,000).
• 71% of the global Êzîdî population was displaced in 2015.
• In 2024 there were still 150,000–190,000 IDPs in Kurdistan camps (UN-OCHA).
• Sinjar return rate 2024: 43%.
• 19 January 2023: The German Bundestag formally recognizes the genocide against the Êzîdî.

Sources

• IOM Iraq DTM [Trust 10]
• Cetorelli/Sasson, “Mortality and kidnapping estimates,” PLOS Medicine 2017 [Trust 10]
• UN-OCHA Iraq Sinjar reports 2024 [Trust 10]
• Free Yezidi Foundation, “Yezidi Displacement” [Trust 8]
• Atlantic Council, “An open wound, a fading light” 2025 [Trust 7]

11. Migration wave 9: 2018–2024 → Afrin displacement

Trigger

• January 2018: Turkish “Operation Olive Branch” against the Kurdish YPG/SDF in Afrin.
• 18 March 2018: Turkey + the Syrian National Army (SNA) take over the city of Afrin.
• 20 of 22 Êzîdî villages depopulated. Sanctuaries desecrated (among them Şêx Adî in Qastel Cindo).
• October 2019 “Operation Peace Spring”: Êzîdî cluster near Serê Kaniyê depopulated.

Route

Afrin → Tel Refaat / Shahba (north of Aleppo, SDF/government territory) → IDP camps

Only a very small number were able to travel onward to Europe (the Syria-Turkey border was closed).

Result

• The Êzîdî population of Afrin fell from 25,000 (2018) to 5,000 (2024).
• Syrian Êzîdî overall: only 10,000–15,000 remaining.

12. Maps: textual description

Map A: Êzîdî core region ca. 1800

 _________________________________
 | BLACK SEA |
 |________________________________|
 | |
 | RUSSIAN EMPIRE |
 | |
 |__________Caucasus______________|
 | | |
 | | PERSIA |
 | OTTOMAN EMP. | (Iran) |
 | | |
 | *Van *Kars | *Khoy |
 | | *Urmia |
 | *Mardin | |
 | *Tur Abdîn---+---Şingal |
 | *Şanlıurfa | *Sheikhan |
 | *Lalîş |
 | *Afrin*Hasaka |
 |________________________________|
 | ARABIAN DESERT |
 |________________________________|

The Êzîdî core region: arc-shaped from Van (NW) over Tur Abdîn (SW) to Sinjar (SE), the “Êzîdî crescent.”

Map B: Migration routes 1828–1918

 RUSSIAN EMPIRE
 ⇧
 [Tbilisi] [Yerevan]
 ⇧ ⇧
 Surmalu Aparan ⇦ Russia
 ⇧ ⇧
 ⇧ ⇧
 Bazîd ⇦──────⇦──────⇦ Van/Kars
 OTTOMAN EMPIRE
 ⇧
 ⇧
 Mardin/Tur Abdîn
 ⇧
 ⇧
 Sinjar/Sheikhan
 (IRAQ today)

1828, 1877, 1915: Three waves NORTHWARD out of the Ottoman Empire into the Russian Empire.

Map C: Migration routes 1964–1992 (Turkey → DE)

[Mardin/Tur Abdîn] ⇨ [Istanbul] ⇨ ⇨ ⇨ [Munich] ⇨ [Stuttgart] ⇨ [Cologne/NRW] ⇨ [Celle/Hannover]
 (TR) (rail/bus) (DE)

Map D: 2014 Sinjar genocide flight routes

 ★ Mount Sinjar (Çiyayê Şingal)
 \
 \ PKK/YPG corridor
 \ (12–13 Aug. 2014)
 \
 Sinjar city ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ Mount ⇒ Rojava (Syria) ⇒ Faysh Khabur ⇒ Dohuk (KRG-Iraq)
 ⇩
 IDP camps Khanke/Sharya
 ⇩
 (secondary migration 2015+)
 ⇩
 Turkey (smuggler) ⇨ Aegean (boat) ⇨ Greece ⇨ Balkan route ⇨ GERMANY
 ⇩
 Hannover/Celle/Bielefeld/Oldenburg

Map E: Global Êzîdî diaspora 2024

 STOCKHOLM ★ OSLO ★ HELSINKI
 LINCOLN ★ GOTHENBURG ★ HANNOVER ★★★ MOSCOW ★★
 OMAHA ★ LONDON ★ AMSTERDAM ★ BERLIN ★ KRASNODAR ★★
 PARIS ★ BIELEFELD ★★ STAVROPOL ★★
 ZURICH ★ VIENNA ★ TBILISI ★★
 YEREVAN ★★★ (Aparan/Aknalich)
 ⇩
 URMIA ★
 AFRIN ★
 LALÎŞ ★★★★★ (Holiest)
 SINJAR ★★★★★ (Heartland)
 SHEIKHAN ★★★★
 ARMIDALE ★★ (AU NSW)
 SYDNEY ★
 TORONTO ★ WINNIPEG ★

★ = diaspora location. More stars = larger community.

13. Lincoln, Nebraska special case

Why Lincoln, Nebraska, became the largest Êzîdî community in North America

1. UN Refugee Program 1992+: The US refugee resettlement program selects mid-sized cities with low living costs + religious sponsoring organizations. Lincoln met both criteria.

2. Religious sponsoring organizations on the ground:

• Catholic Social Services of Southern Nebraska + Lutheran Family Services of Nebraska were two of the largest US refugee sponsors.
• Both had good structures for Middle Eastern refugees since the 1980s (Bosnians, Iraqis).

3. Three waves in Lincoln (cf. Daily Nebraskan 2018):

• Mid-1990s (1st Gulf War): A few hundred Êzîdî, former US military interpreters.
• 2007–2014 (2nd Gulf War + Qahtaniyah bombings 2007): Main wave via UNHCR; Lincoln becomes the principal destination.
• 2014+ (Sinjar genocide): SIV + UNHCR resettlement, family reunification; community grows to ~3,000.

4. Community effect (chain migration): Êzîdî brought relatives and acquaintances over. The Lincoln Refugee Resettlement Office became the “Êzîdî hub.”

5. Local infrastructure:

• Yazda, Yazidi Cultural Center Lincoln: 300 N. 27th Street → yazda.org
• English- and Kurmancî-language courses
• Citizenship preparation
• Yazidi Cemetery in Wyuka with traditional east-facing orientation
• Lincoln, NE became the “Yazidi Capital of North America”

6. Academic engagement:

• University of Nebraska-Lincoln “Yazidi History Harvest”: oral-history project
• Department of History, UNL documents Êzîdî heritage academically

Sources:

• Nebraska Public Media, “A decade after genocide” 2024 [Trust 8]
• ICMC International Catholic Migration Commission [Trust 7]
• PBS NewsHour, “Terrorized by ISIS, Yazidi refugees find welcoming community in Nebraska” [Trust 7]
• Daily Nebraskan, “Lincoln provides safe space for Yazidi refugee community” 2018 [Trust 6]
• yazda.org/yazda [Trust 7]

14. Migration waves summary table

15. Source index

Academic primary sources (Trust 9–10)

• Cetorelli, Valeria & Sasson, Isaac (2017): “Mortality and kidnapping estimates for the Yazidi population in the area of Mount Sinjar, Iraq, in August 2014: A retrospective household survey.” PLOS Medicine 14(5). https://journals.plos.org/plosmedicine/article?id=10.1371/journal.pmed.1002297
• Ismael, Murad & Kalian, Yousif (2019): “The Yazidi Firmans (Pogroms, Genocides, and Ethnic Cleansing): A Historical Perspective.” University of Toronto Press / GSI. https://utppublishing.com/
• Eppel, Michael (2019): “Genocidal Campaigns during the Ottoman Era: The Firmān of Mīr-i-Kura against the Yazidi Religious Minority in 1832–1834.” Genocide Studies International 13(1).
• Allison, Christine (2011): “Construction of Kurdish and Yezidi Identities…” University of Exeter.
• Açıkyıldız, Birgül (2010): “The Yezidis: The History of a Community, Culture and Religion.” I.B. Tauris (chapter on migration + persecution).
• Kreyenbroek, Philip (1995): “Yezidism: Its Background, Observances and Textual Tradition.” Mellen.
• Kreyenbroek, Philip & Kartal, Z. (2009): “Yezidism in Europe: Different Generations Speak about their Religion.” Harrassowitz.
• Kızılhan, Jan İlhan (2018): “Transgenerationale Folgen des Genozids an den Jesiden.” Springer.
• Omarkhali, Khanna (2017): “The Yezidi Religious Textual Tradition.” Harrassowitz.

UN/IGO sources (Trust 10)

• IOM Iraq Displacement Tracking Matrix → iraqdtm.iom.int
• UN-OCHA Iraq Sinjar reports → reliefweb.int
• UN-Habitat, “Emerging Land Tenure Issues among Displaced Yazidis from Sinjar, Iraq”
• EUAA Country Guidance Iraq 2024 + Syria 2023
• UNHCR Refugee Data Finder
• Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Report on ISIS–Êzîdî crimes 2014–2016

NGO sources (Trust 7–8)

• Free Yezidi Foundation → freeyezidi.org
• Yazda → yazda.org
• Nadia’s Initiative → nadiasinitiative.org
• Yezidi Legal Network → yazidilegalnetwork.org
• Central Council of the Êzîdî in Germany (ZÊD) → zentralrat-eziden.com
• ProAsyl 2024 “The Yazidis” report
• Yezidi Studies Center Hannover → yezidistudiescenter.org

Official recognitions (Trust 10)

• Federal Constitutional Court 30.06.1992 ref. 2 BvR 1968/91 (Êzîdî persecuted as a group)
• Bundestag 19.01.2023 genocide recognition
• Canadian House of Commons 2016 genocide recognition
• US House of Representatives 2016 genocide resolution
• European Parliament 4.2.2016 genocide resolution

Media sources (Trust 5–7)

• Atlantic Council “An open wound, a fading light” 2025
• PBS Frontline “Yazidis a decade after ISIS’s genocidal campaign”
• PBS NewsHour Lincoln coverage
• Al Jazeera “Inside the world’s biggest Yazidi temple”
• InfoMigrants route reportages
• Kurdistan24, Rudaw
• SBS News Australia, Daily Nebraskan

Special topics

• Allison, Christine (2017): Êzîdî language politics in Armenia
• Spät, Eszter (2018): Yezidi Identity Politics
• Schmidinger, Thomas (2019): Beyond ISIS
• Tagay, Sefik & Ortac, Sefa (2016): Die Eziden und das Ezidentum

End of migration routes research. Companion document: research-ezdiki-diaspora-demographie.md (population statistics per country).