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Êzîdî Identity and Ethnogenesis
In brief: Are the Êzîdî a distinct people or a religious community within the Kurdish people? There is no consensus answer to this question, neither in scholarship nor within the community itself. This article separates three things that are often conflated: the self-identification of the Êzîdî (heterogeneous, varying from region to region), the scholarly ethnogenesis theories (how the group came into being historically), and the legal-political recognition (how Êzîdî are classified in census and law). Both main positions, “part of the Kurds” and “a distinct people, the Êzîdî”, are placed side by side here objectively, attributed, and without judgement.
Methodology: This is a deliberately neutral presentation of a highly sensitive, politically charged topic. Each position is attributed to a source or a named representative (author/name year). The article does not decide the question and ascribes normative correctness to no position. To be distinguished from two neighbouring topics: How old is the religion? deals with dating; Linguistics deals with the language. Here the focus is solely on identity and ethnogenesis.
1. What makes the question so difficult: three separate levels
The identity debate seems irresolvable only because three different questions get mixed up. Anyone who separates them can locate each position more precisely:
| Level | Question | Discipline | Character of the answer |
|---|---|---|---|
| E1, Self-identification | As what do the Êzîdî understand themselves? | Sociology, field research | empirical, heterogeneous (regionally varying) |
| E2, Ethnogenesis | How did the group come into being historically? | History, religious studies | scholarly hypotheses |
| E3, Recognition | How is the group legally counted? | Law, politics, statistics | varies by state |
Crucially: these levels are independent of one another. A person may understand themselves religiously as Êzîdî and at the same time ethnically as Kurdish (E1), while their state lists them in the census as a separate nationality (E3), and scholarship classifies their group as a Kurdish-anchored ethnoreligion (E2). There is no logical necessity for all three levels to give the same answer.
Key term: ethnoreligion
Scholarship mostly describes the Êzîdî as an ethnoreligion (an ethno-religious or ethno-confessional community): a group whose religious and ethnic belonging are inseparably fused. One is born an Êzîdî, conversion to Êzîdîism is traditionally impossible, marriage is permitted only within the community and the castes (see Purity & Taboos on the caste endogamy principle). Asatrian/Arakelova (2014) formulate that religious identity (centred on Şerfedîn and Tawûsî Melek) has “unified religion and ethnicity”. It is precisely this fusion that is the reason the identity question cannot be neatly resolved into “religion only” or “people only”.
Convention: Tawûsî Melek, the Peacock Angel, is in Êzîdîism the highest angelic figure appointed by God, the equation with “the Devil” widespread in the literature is a foreign ascription and slander, not an Êzîdî position (see Tawûsî Melek and Falsifications & Slanders).
2. E1: Self-identification: a heterogeneous picture
There is no uniform Êzîdî self-positioning. Scholarship agrees that the community is internally divided here and regionally diverse in character (Maisel 2017; Kreyenbroek/Omarkhali; Açıkyıldız 2010). The English Wikipedia summarises the state of research as follows: there is “disagreement among Êzîdî themselves, with some understanding themselves as part of the Kurdish people, others as a distinct ethnic identity as Êzîdî”.
The two main positions, objectively and without judgement:
Position A: “Êzîdî are (also) Kurds”
Representatives of this view understand Êzîdîism as a religion within the Kurdish people: one is ethnically Kurdish and religiously Êzîdî, comparable to Muslim, Christian or Jewish Kurds.
- Language argument: The religious and everyday language of most Êzîdî is Kurmancî (Northern Kurdish); nearly all sacred texts (Qewl) are composed in Kurmancî (Kreyenbroek 1995; Allison 2001). Cross-reference: Linguistics.
- Geography/culture: The core settlement area and religious centre (Lalîş, Şingal) lie in the Kurdish-shaped region of northern Iraq; dress, folklore and social order share many elements with the surrounding Kurdish culture.
- Empirical voices: In Armenia, Christine Allison (INALCO) reports: “I have met more Êzîdî in Armenia who believe that they are Kurds as well.” In Georgia, Rostom Atashov (Union of the Êzîdî in Georgia) says: “We are both Êzîdî and Kurds. We have one language, and that is Kurdish” (IWPR).
Position B: “Êzîdî are a distinct people”
Representatives of this view emphasise a distinct ethnic identity as Êzîdî, independent of the Kurdish people. Arguments and bearers of this position:
- Own self-designation & endogamy: The Êzîdî define themselves primarily through being Êzîdî, not through “Kurdishness”; the strict endogamy is held to have produced a closed descent community over the centuries.
- Language as “Êzdîkî”: In Armenia and Georgia many representatives designate their language not as “Kurmancî” but as Êzdîkî and emphasise it as a distinct identity marker (Hasan Tamoyan, ed. Yezidikhana; cf. IWPR).
- History of persecution: Since the Êzîdî were persecuted over the centuries precisely as Êzîdî (and not as Kurds), representatives argue that being Êzîdî is the defining identity marker (thus the title of the study Kizilhan/… “We Are Yezidi, Being Otherwise Never Stopped Our Persecution”, 2020).
- Political breach of trust: Parts of the community trace the distancing from Kurdishness back to concrete political experiences (see Section 5 on the effect of 2014).
Important contextualisation, no judgement: Both positions exist within the community in reality and are advocated by Êzîdî actors. Scholarship moreover describes a change over time: Maisel (2017) shows for Syria how local identities shift and become unified; several authors observe that parts of the community have “increasingly distanced themselves from Kurdishness in recent years”. Identity here is thus not static but an ongoing, politically influenced process.
3. E2: Scholarly ethnogenesis theories
At the level of historical emergence (not self-perception) there are several scholarly hypotheses. They are to be read as hypotheses, not as final truths, and in part do not exclude one another.
Theory 1: Kurdish anchoring (majority position in Iranian studies)
The most widespread classification in Iranian studies: the Êzîdî are a religiously defined group with deep roots in the Kurdish world, linguistically and culturally Kurdish. Philip Kreyenbroek (Göttingen) puts it pointedly: “Obviously the Êzîdî are Kurds”, their common language is Kurmancî, including the sacred texts, their origin lies in the Lalîş region of northern Iraq; “the Êzîdî religious and cultural tradition is deeply rooted in Kurdish culture”. Christine Allison (2001; INALCO) shares this assessment.
Theory 2: Iranian/pre-Islamic substratum
Closely linked to Theory 1: the religion is the endpoint of a pre-Islamic, ancient Iranian world of belief, formed from elements that Kreyenbroek (1995) describes as an interaction of “Islam, Zoroastrianism and a pre-Zoroastrian Iranian faith”. This theory primarily concerns the religious origin (cf. How old is the religion?) and indirectly supports the ethnic classification within the Iranian-Kurdish linguistic and cultural sphere.
Warning from scholarship: Against the popular equation “Êzîdîism = original religion of the Kurds = Zoroastrianism” authors such as Richard Foltz warn (“The ‘Original’ Kurdish Religion? … The False Conflation of the Yezidi and Zoroastrian Traditions”). This equation is held to be often nationalistically motivated and historically untenable, an example of how the ethnogenesis question is politically instrumentalised.
Theory 3: Syncretic formation in the 12th century
The historically tangible community arose through the influence of Şêx Adî ibn Musafir (12th c.) and his ʿAdawiyya order upon an already existing substratum in the Mosul highlands. Açıkyıldız (2010) and the Encyclopaedia Iranica describe how, out of an initially Sufi-shaped circle, an increasingly Kurdish-dominated, distinct religious community formed. In this reading the Êzîdî identity is historically become (not “distinct since the beginning”), formed from Iranian-Kurdish material along a confessional path.
Theory 4: Distinct ethnic genesis
A minority of authors as well as many community-internal representatives emphasise a distinct ethnic genealogy that goes beyond the religious definition. Asatrian/Arakelova (2014) stress that the fusion of religion and ethnicity among the Êzîdî is so strong that a purely “religious subgroup of the Kurds” does not do justice to their self-perception. This view overlaps with Position B from Section 2.
Relationship of the theories: 1, 2 and 3 are largely compatible: they describe different aspects (cultural-linguistic anchoring, religious substratum, institutional shaping). Theory 4 stands partly in tension with them, but emphasises a different level (lived ethnic self-definition rather than philological derivation). A scholarly final consensus on the identity question expressly does not exist.
4. Language as an identity marker
Language is the single most fiercely contested argument of the debate, and a prime example of how the same fact is interpreted in opposite ways.
- Fact: The overwhelming majority of Êzîdî speak Kurmancî, and nearly all religious texts are composed in this language (Kreyenbroek 1995; Omarkhali 2017).
- Interpretation A: Precisely because sacred texts exist in Kurmancî, the Kurdish anchoring is evident (Kreyenbroek, Allison).
- Interpretation B: The language is a distinct variety called Êzdîkî; its written codification (in Armenia at times in Cyrillic script) was even rejected by parts of the community because it was perceived as external control (Torkom Khudoyan, National Committee of Yezidis of Armenia; cf. IWPR).
Linguistically “Êzdîkî” is largely identical with Kurmancî; the distinction is primarily one of identity politics, not of linguistic systematics (details and evidence: Linguistics). Precisely here it becomes apparent that the identity question cannot be decided by language data alone, both sides invoke the same linguistic reality.
Convention of this wiki: Proper names and terms are written in Kurmancî Latin script (Êzîdî, Êzîden, Tawûsî Melek, Şêx Adî, Lalîş, Şingal, Qewl). This is an editorial spelling convention and not a position in the Êzdîkî/Kurmancî debate.
5. E3: The legal-political dimension
How Êzîdî are officially counted varies from state to state, and this counting feeds back into the identity debate.
Census and recognition categories
| State | Official classification of the Êzîdî | Source/note |
|---|---|---|
| Iraq | recognised as a distinct religious/ethnic group | Wikipedia Yazidis; constitutional and minority context |
| Armenia | listed as a distinct ethnic group | Census 2011: ~35,000; 2022: 31,079 |
| Georgia | predominantly listed as ethnic Kurds | Census 2014: 12,174 |
| Germany | predominantly perceived as a (Kurdish) religious minority | see Êzîdî in Germany |
| Soviet Union | shifting: 1926 Êzîdî and Kurds separate; later combined; 1989 ~52,700 persons listed as “Kurds” recategorised as “Êzîdî” | Soviet census history; IWPR |
The Armenian figures are politically especially charged: in the 2001 census 40,620 persons identified as Êzîdî and only 1,519 as Kurds (IWPR), which representatives of Position B cite as evidence of a distinct ethnic identity, while representatives of Position A point to the decades-long state recategorisation policy and the regional special situation.
Consequences of the 2014 genocide for the identity debate
The genocide of Şingal (3 August 2014) by the so-called “Islamic State”, over 5,000 murdered Êzîdî, around 7,000 abducted women and girls (UN estimates), has noticeably sharpened the identity debate (details: Genocide 2014). Several authors describe the effect as follows:
- Parts of the community experienced the events as a breach of trust and have since increasingly emphasised a distinct Êzîdî identity, separate from Kurdishness (Kizilhan et al. 2020: “We Are Yezidi…”).
- At the same time, the genocide internationally strengthened the demand for distinct legal recognition as a people/minority. Armenia, for instance, has recognised the massacres as genocide (Eurasianet).
- The experience of having been released for annihilation as Êzîdî has thereby itself become an identity argument, which shows the interweaving of the history of persecution, politics and self-understanding.
Neutrality note: That the genocide intensified the turn towards a distinct identity is a descriptive observation of scholarship, not a judgement about which identity position is “correct”. Other Êzîdî draw from the very same history precisely the conclusion of shared Kurdish solidarity.
6. Diaspora generations and new identity designs
In the Western diaspora (Germany, with the largest Êzîdî community outside the region of origin) the question shifts once again. Young Êzîdî who grew up in Europe negotiate identity between several poles at once (see Young Diaspora):
- Some adopt Position B (a distinct Êzîdî people) as a self-confident, demarcating identity, reinforced by the visibility of the genocide.
- Others combine the Êzîdî religion with a Kurdish cultural belonging (Position A).
- A third group defines itself primarily transnationally/hybridly (German-Êzîdî), for whom the classical people-vs.-religion question loses its sharpness.
Characteristic of the diaspora is that identity there is negotiated less through state census categories than through associations, online communities and educational work: a shift from ascribed to actively shaped identity.
7. Summary: three answers, one stance
- E1 (self-identification): non-uniform. Both “part of the Kurds” and “a distinct people, the Êzîdî” are really lived positions advocated by Êzîdî actors, varying regionally and generationally.
- E2 (ethnogenesis): Iranian studies locate the Êzîdî predominantly as Kurdish-Iranian (Kreyenbroek, Allison); a final consensus on the identity question does not exist. The equation with “original Zoroastrianism” is considered nationalistically overlaid and historically dubious (Foltz).
- E3 (recognition): state-dependent, Iraq and Armenia list the Êzîdî as a distinct group, Georgia and (de facto) Germany rather as Kurdish. The 2014 genocide has strengthened the demand for distinct recognition.
This article deliberately takes none of the positions. Identity here is not a riddle to be solved but a living, politically contested process, whose bearers are the Êzîdî themselves. The task of an encyclopaedia is to place the positions side by side, cleanly attributed, not to decide between them.
Sources
- Philip G. Kreyenbroek: Yezidism, Its Background, Observances and Textual Tradition. Edwin Mellen Press, 1995.
- Christine Allison: The Yezidi Oral Tradition in Iraqi Kurdistan. Curzon Press, 2001.
- Khanna Omarkhali: The Yezidi Religious Textual Tradition. Harrassowitz, 2017.
- Birgül Açıkyıldız: The Yezidis, The History of a Community, Culture and Religion. I.B. Tauris, 2010.
- Sebastian Maisel: Yezidis in Syria, Identity Building among a Double Minority. Lexington Books, 2017., https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781498549806/Yezidis-in-Syria-Identity-Building-among-a-Double-Minority
- Garnik S. Asatrian / Victoria Arakelova: The Religion of the Peacock Angel, The Yezidis and Their Spirit World. Routledge/Acumen, 2014., https://www.routledge.com/The-Religion-of-the-Peacock-Angel-The-Yezidis-and-Their-Spirit-World/Asatrian-Arakelova/p/book/9781032179759
- Richard Foltz: „The ‚Original’ Kurdish Religion? Kurdish Nationalism and the False Conflation of the Yezidi and Zoroastrian Traditions." Journal of Persianate Studies, 2017., https://www.researchgate.net/publication/318266071
- J. I. Kizilhan u. a.: „‚We Are Yezidi, Being Otherwise Never Stopped Our Persecution’, Yezidi Perceptions of Kurds and Kurdish Identity." 2020., https://www.researchgate.net/publication/348129319
- Encyclopaedia Iranica, „Yazidis i. General.": https://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/yazidis-i-general-1
- Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR): „Armenia: Yezidi Identity Battle.", https://iwpr.net/global-voices/armenia-yezidi-identity-battle
- Rudaw: „The Yezidis of Armenia Face Identity Crisis over Kurdish Ethnicity.", https://www.rudaw.net/english/people-places/28052014
- Eurasianet: „Armenia Recognizes IS Massacres of Yezidis as Genocide.", https://eurasianet.org/armenia-recognizes-is-massacres-of-yezidis-as-genocide
- Wikipedia: „Yazidis" (identity, census and recognition sections; as of 2026)., https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yazidis
Note: The academic outside perspective and community-internal self-statements are kept separate in the text. All identity positions are attributed and do not evaluate one another.
Related articles: How old is the religion? · Linguistics & Language · Êzîdî Religion · Diaspora · Young Diaspora · Genocide 2014 · Êzîdî in Germany
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