geschichte

Political situation of the Yazidis worldwide

en11,892 words⏱ approx. 54 min read📚 35 sections🔖 ≥332 sourcesQuality A

8 verified · Wikimedia Commons · CC license

🖼 Images

Status: 2026-05. Documents the legal and de-facto situation of the Êzîdîs in 32 countries worldwide. Methodology: at least 2 independent sources per statement. At least 5 sources per country. Political honesty: whitewashing is avoided, KDP, Turkish, Iranian, Iraqi and also Western policies are clearly named where they have harmed or helped the Êzîdîs.

Heartland (Middle East)

Iraq (Şingal/Sinjar, Şêxan, Bahzanî, Behzane)
Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRG), special case
Syria (Afrîn, Hesekê)
Turkey (Mêrdîn, Diyarbakır, Bacın, Batman)
Iran (Urmia region)

Post-Soviet space 6. Armenia (Aparan, Alagyaz, Yerevan) 7. Georgia (Tbilisi, Telavi) 8. Russia (Krasnodar, Stavropol) 9. Azerbaijan 10. Kazakhstan 11. Ukraine

EU diaspora 12. Germany (~250,000, largest diaspora) 13. Sweden 14. France 15. Netherlands 16. Belgium 17. United Kingdom 18. Norway 19. Denmark 20. Austria 21. Switzerland 22. Italy 23. Spain 24. Greece

Overseas 25. USA (Lincoln, Nebraska) 26. Canada (Winnipeg, Toronto, London ON) 27. Australia (Armidale, NSW) 28. Brazil 29. Argentina 30. Israel 31. Japan 32. United Arab Emirates (transit/guest workers)

1. Iraq (Êzîdî heartland: Şingal, Şêxan, Bahzanî, Behzane)

Population: 400,000–500,000 (before 2014: about 550,000), IOM Iraq 2023; Yazda Country Report 2024 Legal status: recognised religious minority (Constitution 2005, Art. 2 + Art. 125); Mîr officially respected; secular jurisdiction applies; own civil status registers however only codified at state level since the Yazidi Survivors Law 2021. Genocide recognition: Iraqi parliament, 1 March 2021 (Yazidi Survivors Law / قانون الناجيات الإيزيديات No. 8/2021).

Historical Êzîdî presence

The Êzîdîs in today’s Iraq are considered autochthonous. The Lalîş region, Şêxan and the Şingal Mountains have been continuously Êzîdî-settled since at least the 12th century. Sheikh Adi ibn Musafir († ca. 1162) founded the spiritual centre in Lalîş, which remains a pilgrimage destination to this day. Şingal was resettled in the 19th century after pogroms by Mîrê Kor (Mîr Mihemed of Rawanduz, 1832) and the Ottomans, many Êzîdîs fled then into the Şingal Mountains, where they still live today.

Current status of rights

De jure: the Iraqi Constitution of 2005 guarantees in Art. 2 religious freedom for “Christians, Êzîdîs and Sabian Mandaeans”. Art. 125 recognises the Êzîdîs as an ethno-religious component. The Yazidi Survivors Law 2021 creates individual compensation for surviving women and captured children. De facto: reconstruction in Şingal has stalled since 2017. Electricity, water, schools, hospitals are largely missing. Around 200,000 Êzîdîs continue to live in IDP camps in Duhok (KRG region), as of IOM 2024, the camps remain in operation despite an announced closure. Over 2,700 Êzîdîs are still considered missing (Yazda 2024).

Target state

Democratic minimum standards would foresee: full implementation of the Sinjar Agreement (9.10.2020), withdrawal of all armed groups, a reconstruction budget with clear Êzîdî participation, full exhumation of the 80+ mass graves, issuance of missing-persons papers, prosecution of Daesh (so-called Islamic State) perpetrators before Iraqi courts and the ICC.

Timeline

1832: Mîr Mihemed Pasha Rewendî (Soran Emirate), pogrom in Şingal and Şêxan
1892: ferman of the Ottoman general Omer Wehbî Pasha
1915–1918: persecution in the context of the Armenian genocide; many Êzîdîs help Armenian refugees
1969: the Baath government Arabises the Mosul plain, Êzîdî villages are resettled into “collective towns” (Tel Banat, Tel Uzeir, Khanesor, Sinune, Tel Qassab etc.)
2007 (14 August): multiple bombing in Til Ezêr / Sîba Şêx Xidir, 796 dead per the final count, initial reports ~500 (FBI report; UN AMI)
2014 (3 August): Daesh (so-called Islamic State) attack on Şingal. Around 3,100 Êzîdî murdered (PLOS Medicine 2017; NGO/UN figures up to ~5,000), ~6,800 women and children enslaved (Yazda; UN Commission of Inquiry Syria 2016)
2015 (13 November): Şingal town liberated by YPG/YBŞ + Peshmerga
2017 (October): Iraqi Federal Army + PMU take over Şingal after KDP withdrawal
2020 (9 October): Sinjar Agreement between Baghdad and Erbil, administrative structure, security, reconstruction
2021 (1 March): Yazidi Survivors Law (Law No. 8/2021)
2023–2024: Turkish drone strikes in Şingal, death of YBŞ commander Said Hasan and others
2024–2026: IDP camps in Duhok closed de jure, de facto thousands still live there

Persecution + oppression

Historical: 74 fermans (count of the Mîr family/diaspora; traditionally also 72 or 73), persecution by the Soran Emirate, the Ottoman Empire, Saddam-Hussein Baathism (Arabisation). Saddam’s regime banned the Kurdish language, destroyed Êzîdî villages along the “Green Line”. Current: Turkish drone strikes on Şingal since 2017 officially target PKK/YBŞ but regularly hit civilians (Airwars Documentation 2023; UN OHCHR 2024). The dispute between KDP, PMU, YBŞ, Iraqi army and PKK makes Şingal a militarised zone. Schools, hospitals, electricity and water are still not functional in many villages.

Government policy

The Iraqi federal government (Baghdad) has, since 2014, recognised the genocide against the Êzîdîs and passed the Survivors Law. Implementation, however, fails due to: bureaucratic hurdles (applicants need DNA tests, witnesses), budget tightness, parallel power structures in Şingal. The Sinjar Agreement is de facto unimplemented, none of the conflict parties has given up its military claim.

Outlook

Realistic: Şingal remains divided. The number of returnees stagnates at about 50 %. The diaspora continues to grow (Germany, Australia, Canada). Worrying: Turkey escalation, Iran-USA conflict spillover, KDP-PMU front line could flare militarily again. Optimistic: the Yazidi Survivors Law is being slowly implemented; some mass graves are being exhumed with UN aid (UNITAD until Sept. 2024).

Sources

Iraqi Constitution (2005), Art. 2 + Art. 125: http://www.iraqld.iq/LoadLawBook.aspx?SC=&BookID=28190
UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria, A/HRC/32/CRP.2 (15.6.2016), “They came to destroy: Daesh Crimes Against the Yazidis”
Yazidi Survivors Law No. 8/2021: Iraqi National Gazette, 1.3.2021
UNITAD Final Report (Sept. 2024): UN Investigative Team
IOM Iraq DTM Round 138 (2024): Sinjar Return Index
Yazda “Sinjar Status Report 2024”: yazda.org
Free Yezidi Foundation Annual Report 2024
Open Doors World Watch List 2025: Iraq Country Profile
HRW “Iraq: Yezidi Survivors Law Implementation Gaps” (3/2023)
Pew Research “Religion in Iraq” (2023 update)

2. Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRG): special case

Population: ~200,000 Êzîdîs in Duhok province + Erbil province (IDP camps + autochthonous Şêxan) Legal status: within the KRG draft constitution (2009) declared as a “component of the Kurdish people”, an appropriative reading rejected by parts of the Êzîdî community. Genocide recognition: KRG parliament 2014 (formally, but the Mîr conflict persists)

Historical Êzîdî presence

Şêxan, Lalîş, the Mosul plain lie historically in the “disputed territories” zone. Before 1991 under Baghdad, after 1991 de facto under KRG control, from 2003 onwards intensified appropriation by the KDP (Barzani family).

Current status of rights

De jure: the KRG officially recognises Êzîdîs as a religious component, grants free access to Lalîş, partially finances temple restorations. De facto: KDP policy of “Kurdification”, Êzîdî children are taught in school that they are “Kurds with a different religion”, not an independent ethnicity. Êzîdî identity on ID cards is often entered as “Kurd”. Political Êzîdî voices critical of the KDP (e.g. the movement for a separate Êzîdî province “Êzîdkhan”) are marginalised.

Target state

Self-determination of the Êzîdî community: free choice of ethnic affiliation on the ID card, own political representation, no appropriation by a competing Kurdish-national movement.

Timeline

1991: Kurdistan Region de facto autonomous after the Gulf War
1992: first KRG election, Êzîdîs as a vote reservoir for the KDP
2003 (US invasion): KDP takes over Şingal administration
2007: KDP security chief Masrour Barzani announces “protection of the Êzîdîs”, at the bombing of Til Ezêr on 14.8.2007 the Peshmerga are on site but cannot/will not prevent anything
2014 (3 August): Peshmerga withdraw from Şingal, pre-warning of the Êzîdî population insufficient. To this day Êzîdî diaspora discourse says: “Peschmerge me xistin ber qedera Daîş’ê” (Peshmerga delivered us to the fate of Daesh).
2017: Kurdistan independence referendum, Êzîdîs in Şingal excluded from the vote since no longer under KRG control
2024: Mîr Hazim Tahsin Beg (* 1963) on a compromise course between Baghdad and Erbil

Persecution + oppression

Historical: KDP policy of ethnic appropriation since 1991, Êzîdîs are framed in school and media as “religious component of the Kurdish nation”. Current: political Êzîdîs who advocate for a separate autonomous province “Êzîdkhan” (plan: Şingal + Şêxan + Mosul plain) experience job discrimination in KRG administration; some activists have had to flee abroad.

Government policy

KRG has financed a Mîr secretariat in Şêxan, expanded the Lalîş road, provided reconstruction aid. But: no political autonomy granted. In the Sinjar Agreement 2020 the KDP continues to try to bring security under its own control, Baghdad blocks this, since PMU + Iraqi army are on site.

Outlook

Realistic: KDP-Êzîdî relationship remains asymmetric. Mîr Hazim continues to balance between Baghdad and Erbil. Worrying: in case of a KRG crisis (internal KDP-PUK conflicts, Turkish pressure), further displacements loom.

Sources

KRG Constitution Draft (2009): krg.org
Birgül Açikyildiz “The Yezidis: The History of a Community, Culture and Religion” (I.B. Tauris, 2010)
Sebastian Maisel “Yezidis in Syria: Identity Building among a Double Minority” (Lexington, 2017)
Matthew Travis Barber “Yazidi Persecution in Sinjar 2014”, dissertation University of Chicago (2017)
Christine Allison “The Yezidi Oral Tradition in Iraqi Kurdistan” (Routledge, 2001)
Yazda Statement on Peshmerga Withdrawal (8/2014)
ICG Crisis Group “After Sinjar: How to Ensure the Future of Iraq’s Yazidis” (2019)
Khalil Jindi Rashow “Êzîdîname”: Yazidi self-presentation (2003)

3. Syria (Afrîn, Hesekê, Qamişlo)

Population: ~15,000 (before 2018: about 25,000–30,000 in Afrîn alone); UN OCHA 2023 estimates 12,000–17,000 remaining Legal status: not independently recognised. Before 2024 under Assad: de-facto tolerance as a “Kurdish minority”, no own religious category. Under the HTS transitional government (from 12/2024): legally open, subsumed in pronouncements under “tolerance of all denominations”. Genocide recognition: no Syrian government has officially recognised the 2014 genocide (committed in Iraq, but numerous Syrian Êzîdîs affected).

Historical Êzîdî presence

Êzîdîs in Syria historically settled in two main areas: (1) Çiyayê Kurmênc / Afrîn region northwest of Aleppo, about 23 villages; (2) Jebel Sêmaq (Aleppo countryside) and Cizîre (Hesekê province). Many came in the 19th century from the Ottoman Empire to Syria, others lived autochthonously in the mountains around Afrîn.

Current status of rights

De jure: before 2024, civil status register “Kurdish”, religion officially not entered. Only since 2017 (AANES, Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria) were Êzîdî persons allowed to enter their religion. Under HTS unclear. De facto: Afrîn Êzîdîs almost completely displaced in 2018 by the Turkish “Operation Olive Branch” (20.1.–18.3.2018) and the Syrian National Army (SNA) militias. Temples destroyed, houses occupied, land expropriation. In the northeast (Hesekê, Qamişlo) about 5,000 live under AANES administration relatively freely, with their own religious instruction in some schools.

Target state

Recognition as an independent ethno-religious minority in the Syrian constitution. Return of occupied houses in Afrîn. Prosecution of the SNA perpetrators. Own civil status register with a Êzîdî religious designation.

Timeline

1517–1918: Êzîdî villages in Jebel Sêmaq and Afrîn under Ottoman rule persecuted several times
1920s: French Mandate, relative tolerance; Êzîdîs register as “Yazidi”
1962 (Hesekê census): Êzîdîs + Kurds partly stripped of citizenship (bidoun status)
2011 (start of the civil war): Êzîdîs mostly neutral, many flee
2014 (3 August): Daesh (so-called Islamic State) genocide Iraq, Syrian Êzîdîs in Hesekê region also attacked (e.g. Til Kêf, Til Banat extension areas)
2018 (20 January): Turkish invasion of Afrîn (Operation Olive Branch)
2018 (18 March): SNA + Turkish army control Afrîn, 80+% of Êzîdîs have fled
2019 (October): Turkish Operation Peace Spring, pressure on Hesekê region; AANES loses parts
2024 (8 December): Assad regime falls, HTS takes over Damascus
2025–2026: HTS transitional government under Ahmad al-Sharaa (Abu Mohammed al-Jolani), Êzîdî status still unresolved

Persecution + oppression

Historical: pogroms by Ottoman governors, later discrimination under Assad senior (1970s to 2000), Êzîdîs often had to hide their religion on ID cards. Current: in Afrîn under SNA control: ongoing reports of forced abductions, ransom demands, destruction of the four remaining temples (Ain Dara region, documented 2018; UN OHCHR 2018, 2019). Êzîdîs wishing to return find their houses occupied by SNA families.

Government policy

Assad regime: cold tolerance, no protection. AANES (Kurdish-dominated self-administration): active protection, temple-building in Hesekê (Mezarê Şîxan shrine restoration 2021), own textbooks. HTS transitional government 2024–26: rhetorical tolerance, but no concrete steps in favour of the Êzîdîs in Afrîn.

Outlook

Realistic: most Afrîn Êzîdîs do not return; the diaspora permanently settles in Germany, Sweden, Canada. Worrying: if HTS cooperates with Turkey, Afrîn remains de facto Turkish-occupied. The Hesekê region could be destabilised again by Turkish pressure or Daesh sleeper cells.

Sources

UN Human Rights Council A/HRC/40/70 (31.1.2019), Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Syria, Annex I (Afrîn)
Amnesty International “Syria: Turkey-backed forces in Afrîn” (2.8.2018)
Sebastian Maisel “Yezidis in Syria” (Lexington, 2017)
Syrians for Truth and Justice “Afrin: Yezidi Population under SNA” (2022)
AANES Statute (2014, rev. 2018): autonomyrojava.org
Open Doors WWL 2025 Syria Profile
HRW “Everything is by the Power of the Weapon: Afrin under SNA” (2024)
Atlantic Council “Yazidis in Post-Assad Syria” (2.2025)

4. Turkey (Mêrdîn, Diyarbakır, Batman, Bacın)

Population: 300–500 (TR government 2020); Sefik Tagay/Serhat Ortaç “Die Eziden und das Ezidentum” (2016) names 365 remaining persons. Before 1970: about 80,000. Legal status: NOT recognised as a religious minority (in the sense of the Lausanne Treaty of 1923, only Greeks, Armenians and Jews are “minorities”). Êzîdîs are officially registered as “Muslim” or without religion, no “Yezidi” entry possible. Genocide recognition: NO. Turkey has not recognised the 2014 genocide; the Erdoğan government uses the term “Daesh crimes” without ethnic attribution.

Historical Êzîdî presence

Êzîdîs lived for centuries in the provinces of Mêrdîn, Diyarbakır, Batman, Şirnex, Wan, Bitlis, Êlih (Batman), Sêwregê (Siverek). Before the First World War about 200,000 persons, then through the Armenian genocide 1915, Atatürk republic consolidation 1923–1938, Dersim 1937–38, as well as later migration waves 1960–1990, almost completely vanished.

Current status of rights

De jure: no official recognition as a religious community. Êzîdî temples not protected as cemevî/church/synagogue. Religious education in schools is mandatorily Sunni-Islamic (Diyanet curriculum). De facto: the about 365–500 remaining Êzîdîs live largely hidden. The village of Bacın near Beşîrî (Batman province) is referred to as the “last Êzîdî village of Turkey”, in 2010 still 30 families lived there, in 2023 only 7–10. In Mêrdîn province: some families in Cevizali / Çinar villages.

Target state

Democratic minimum standards: recognition as a religious minority, protection of temples as cultural heritage, reconstruction of the destroyed temples (e.g. Banê Sebax / Bozan-Çinar), right of return for diaspora, compensation for expropriated land (1970–1990 Turkish state expropriations, “mülkiyet” procedures).

Timeline

1915–1918: Êzîdîs in Tur Abdin save Armenian refugees, at the same time persecuted themselves by Ottoman troops (cf. Jebel Sinjar region)
1923: Lausanne Treaty, Êzîdîs not recognised as a minority
1937–38: Dersim massacre, Êzîdî families also affected (mixed with Alevi persecution)
1960s: first migration wave to Germany (guest workers)
1980 (military coup): increased pressure on minorities, Êzîdîs flee in larger numbers
1990s (PKK conflict): village clearances in southeastern Anatolia, 200+ Êzîdî villages depopulated
2010: first official mention by the Turkish state: AKP minister Hayati Yazıcı visits Bacın
2013–2015: several Êzîdî families temporarily return from Germany to Bacın, land problems, they leave again
2020 (textbook revision): Turkish textbooks continue to describe Êzîdîs as “[Unspoken] worshippers” (in religion books of Diyanet publishing 2019); reform pressure from HDP fails
2023 (Erdoğan re-election): no policy change

Persecution + oppression

Historical: over 70 fermans affected today’s southeastern Anatolia. The Atatürk republic expropriated Êzîdî land in at least 12 provinces (source: ZÊD study 2018, Sefik Tagay). Current: religious harassment (temple vandalism, cemetery desecrations documented into the 2010s); Turkish Diyanet textbooks continue to label Êzîdîs as “Şeytanperest” (Diyanet edition 2019, Islamic theology higher education). Turkish drone strikes on Şingal since 2017 (Iraq operations) are de facto anti-Êzîdî, even if officially “anti-PKK”.

Government policy

Erdoğan-AKP government: no recognition, no restitution. Security policy against the PKK hits Êzîdîs in Şingal directly through drones. Education policy: anti-Êzîdî stereotypes in state curricula. “Mêvanperwerî” debate (hospitality narrative) is used to relativise historical expulsions.

Outlook

Realistic: the Êzîdî presence in Turkey is in practice ended. A complete return is demographically and politically excluded. Worrying: Turkish foreign policy against Şingal further escalates, drones, operations, pressure on Baghdad/Erbil. Hope: should a post-Erdoğan government extend in the Lausanne spirit, Mêrdîn Êzîdîs could officially be recognised.

Sources

Lausanne Treaty (24.7.1923): UN Treaty Series, No. 701
Sefik Tagay & Serhat Ortaç “Die Eziden und das Ezidentum” (LIT Verlag, 2016)
Helmut Wolf “Die Yeziden in der Türkei”: Orientwissenschaftliche Hefte 21 (2007)
Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı “İslâm Ansiklopedisi” entry “Yezîdîlik” (online)
HDP faction Turkish parliament “Soru Önergesi” on Yazidis, 2017 (TBMM No. 7/13548)
ZÊD “Êzîden in der Türkei: Ein Volk verschwindet” (2018)
US State Department International Religious Freedom Report 2023, Turkey
Airwars “Turkish Strikes in Sinjar 2017–2024” dataset

5. Iran (Urmia region, Maku, Choi)

Population: 500–1,500 (estimate; no official census data, Êzîdîs are not recorded as a separate category in Iran). Encyclopaedia Iranica 2012 names “several hundred Êzîdîs in the Urmia plain”. Legal status: NOT recognised in the constitution. The Iranian Constitution of 1979/1989 Art. 13 recognises only Zoroastrians, Christians and Jews as official religious minorities. Êzîdîs are considered “indeterminate” (without recognised status), de facto often as “Kurds without confession”. Genocide recognition: NO. Iran has not recognised the 2014 genocide.

Historical Êzîdî presence

The Êzîdî presence in today’s Iran is concentrated in the Urmia region (West Azerbaijan Province), Maku and Choi. Historically these Êzîdîs were part of the larger population in the Ottoman-Persian borderland. In the 19th century (pogrom 1832, then 1892 Omer Wehbî Pasha) some Êzîdî families fled from the Ottoman to the Persian district.

Current status of rights

De jure: Êzîdîs cannot register as “Yazidi”. On ID cards there is “Islam” or “no religion” (which de facto brings considerable disadvantages, inheritance law, marriage, education). De facto: the few remaining Êzîdî families practise their religion in hiding. Temples do not exist. Religious education in Iranian schools is mandatorily Shia-Islamic.

Target state

Extension of Art. 13 of the Iranian Constitution to include the Êzîdîs (analogous to Zoroastrians). Recognition of the religion on ID cards. Own civil status register, free practice of religion.

Timeline

1832: Mîrzâ Beg pogrom, Êzîdî families flee from the Soran Emirate into Persia
1915–18: First World War, Êzîdîs in the Urmia region experience the same persecution as Christians/Assyrians
1979 (Islamic Revolution): Iranian constitution recognises only Zoroastrians, Christians, Jews
1991–2003: some Êzîdî families from the Iranian Urmia region emigrate to Turkey or directly to Western Europe
2014 (3 August): Iran does not officially recognise the genocide, remains diplomatically silent (PMU-aligned politics in Iraq, however, helped the Êzîdî reconquest, irony of the situation)
2022 (Mahsa Amini protests): uprising in Kurdish-Iranian provinces, Êzîdî families partly involved, high arrest rate

Persecution + oppression

Historical: Persian-Ottoman border conflicts led to massacres (e.g. 1832, 1892). Current: religious discrimination in everyday life, professional bans for non-Shia in security forces/military. Êzîdî families report forced Islamic education of their children.

Government policy

Iran officially ignores the Êzîdî question. In Iraq, Iran supports the Êzîdî reconquest fight against Daesh indirectly via PMU militias, paradoxical effect that, however, does nothing to change the discrimination at home. USCIRF Report 2024 lists Iran as a “Country of Particular Concern”, Êzîdîs are one of many marginalised religions.

Outlook

Realistic: Êzîdî presence in Iran will continue to decline. Diaspora migration to Turkey or Western Europe continues. Worrying: an Iran-Israel or Iran-USA war would further pressure all minorities. Optimistic (long-term): post-Khomeini Iran could consider a constitutional reform, but unlikely.

Sources

Iran Constitution (1979, rev. 1989), Art. 13: leadership.ir
Encyclopaedia Iranica “YAZIDIS” (online, 2012), iranicaonline.org/articles/yazidis
USCIRF Annual Report 2024: uscirf.gov
Pew Research “Religious Composition of Iran” (2023)
Khanna Omarkhali “The Yezidi Religious Textual Tradition” (Harrassowitz, 2017), chapter on Urmia Yazidis
HRW “Iran: Religious Discrimination 2023”
Article 18 (UK NGO): Iran Religious Freedom Reports
Garnik Asatrian “The Ethnogenesis of the Kurds and Early Kurdish-Armenian Relations” (2002)

6. Armenia (Aparan, Alagyaz, Yerevan)

Population: 31,079 (Census 2022, statistics.am, Êzîdîs officially the largest minority after Armenians). NGO estimates 35,000–40,000. Legal status: FULLY RECOGNISED as an independent ethno-religious minority. The constitution of Armenia (1995, rev. 2015) Art. 41 guarantees minorities the protection of religion and identity. Êzîdî-specific: Law on National Minorities (2022, “Law on National Minorities”, No. HO-100-N). Genocide recognition: 16 January 2018, the Armenian Parliament (Hayastani Hanrapetut’yan Azgayin Zhoghov) officially recognises the 2014 genocide (resolution).

Historical Êzîdî presence

Êzîdîs came from the end of the 18th century from the Ottoman Empire to Russian Armenia, flight waves 1828 (Russo-Persian War), 1877–78 (Russo-Turkish War), 1915–18 (Armenian Genocide and simultaneous Sinjar pogrom). Êzîdîs saved Armenian families and found shelter with them, a strong historical solidarity.

Current status of rights

De jure: constitutional protection, own language (Êzdîkî/Kurmanji) in school instruction in multilingual schools, own media (Public Radio Armenia has had a Êzîdî programme since 1936), representation in the National Assembly (1 reserved seat for the Êzîdî minority since 2017). De facto: excellent situation. The Êzîdî community builds temples (Quba Mêrê Dîwan in Aknalich 2019), own schools, publishing houses, Êzîdî theatre groups.

Target state

Armenia meets almost all democratic minimum standards. Improvement potential: higher Êzîdî representation in government positions, more textbooks in Kurmanji.

Timeline

1828: first Êzîdî families settle in Russian Armenia
1877–78: second wave (Russo-Turkish War)
1915–18: Êzîdîs save Armenian refugees; reciprocity
1922: Soviet Armenia, Êzîdîs registered as their own nationality on passports
1936: Êzîdî radio programme launches at Radio Yerevan
1991: Independence of Armenia, constitution recognises Êzîdîs
2012: Ziaret temple built in Aknalich (smaller one)
2018 (16 January): parliament’s genocide recognition
2019 (29 September): opening of Quba Mêrê Dîwan in Aknalich, currently the largest Êzîdî temple in the world (donated by Mirza Sloyan)
2022 (Census): 31,079 Êzîdîs officially registered
2024: Êzîdî cultural centre in Yerevan expanded

Persecution + oppression

Historical: Soviet era, religious practice was suppressed (for all religions). No targeted anti-Ezidism. Current: practically none. Occasional social discrimination in rural regions, but without a state component.

Government policy

Armenia pursues an active protection policy. Parliamentarians such as Rustam Bakoyan represent the Êzîdî community. The genocide recognition in 2018 was one of the very first steps worldwide (the Bundestag only followed in 2023!).

Outlook

Realistic: Armenia remains the best protective place for Êzîdîs worldwide. Worrying: demographic pressure through Armenian emigration could fragment the Êzîdî community. Optimistic: the Aknalich temple becomes a global pilgrimage destination.

Sources

Republic of Armenia Constitution (1995, rev. 2015), Art. 41, president.am/en/constitution
Census Armenia 2022: armstat.am
Resolution NA RA “On the Yazidi Genocide 2014” (16.1.2018), parliament.am
Garnik Asatrian “The Yezidis in Armenia” (Iran & the Caucasus, 1999)
Khanna Omarkhali “Yezidi Religious Practices in the Caucasus” (2017)
ZÊD report “Êzîden in Armenien” (2020)
Quba Mêrê Dîwan: documentation Aknalich (architekt.am)
US State Dept. IRF Report 2024 Armenia
HRW “Armenia: Minority Rights 2023”

7. Georgia (Tbilisi, Telavi)

Population: 12,174 (Census 2014, geostat.ge). Before 1990: about 33,000; many emigrated to Russia and Germany. Legal status: recognised as a religious minority under the Georgian “Law on Religion” (2011, rev. 2014). Own religious practice permitted, temple-building permitted. Genocide recognition: NO (no parliamentary resolution until 2026)

Historical Êzîdî presence

Êzîdîs in Georgia came from the late 18th century from the Ottoman Empire, comparable to the Armenian diaspora route. Larger waves 1828, 1877, 1915–18. The Soviet era consolidated the community in Tbilisi and Telavi.

Current status of rights

De jure: religious freedom guaranteed. Êzîdî temple recognised. On ID cards no religious entry (for all citizens equally since 2010). De facto: stable, visible community. Large Sultan Êzîd Temple in Tbilisi since 2015. Own NGOs, cultural associations.

Target state

Genocide recognition, additional protection for Êzîdî cultural heritage, more representation in Georgian politics.

Timeline

1828: first settlements in Tbilisi
1923 (Soviet Georgia): Êzîdîs recognised as a nationality
1991: independence of Georgia
2002: own Êzîdî NGO founded (Sheikh Hasani Centre)
2008 (Russia war): no direct effect on Êzîdîs
2011: religion law protects minority rights
2015 (June): Sultan Êzîd Temple in Tbilisi opens
2014 (Census): 12,174 persons registered
2020s: diaspora migration to Germany continues

Persecution + oppression

Historical: Soviet religious suppression in general. No targeted Êzîdî-specific persecution. Current: occasional social prejudice, but no state pressure.

Government policy

Georgian government allows free practice of religion, finances none, prohibits none. The designation “Êzîdî religion” is treated on equal footing in the Religion Ministry.

Outlook

Realistic: Êzîdî population in Georgia is shrinking through emigration. Worrying: demographic shrinking below 5,000 possible by 2040. Optimistic: temple remains a pilgrimage place of the region.

Sources

Census Georgia 2014: geostat.ge
Georgia Law on Religion (2011): matsne.gov.ge
Aziz Tamoyan “Die Êzîden des Kaukasus” (Tbilisi, 2008)
Rudaw “Yezidi temple opens in Tbilisi” (18.06.2015); DFWatch 2015
USCIRF Annual Report 2024: Georgia section
IBN International Press Center “Yezidis in Georgia”
Birgül Açikyildiz “The Yezidis”: Georgia chapter
HRW “Georgia: Minority Rights Progress 2023”

8. Russia (Krasnodar, Stavropol, Moscow, Saratov)

Population: 40,586 (Census 2010, Rosstat); NGO estimates (Soyuz Yazidov Rossii) 60,000–80,000. Census 2021: 40,488 (slight decrease) Legal status: Êzîdîs registered as an ethnic group in Russia (own line in the census), but not as a religious special group under the “Law on Freedom of Conscience” (1997). Religious practice via association structures. Genocide recognition: NO. The Duma has not addressed the 2014 genocide.

Historical Êzîdî presence

Êzîdîs came via three routes: (1) from the Caucasus (Armenia/Georgia) to southern Russia (Krasnodar, Stavropol); (2) from the Ottoman Empire to Crimea and southern Russia (19th c.); (3) Soviet citizens of Êzîdî origin migrated to Moscow and larger cities. Stalin’s 1944 deportations affected some Êzîdî families from the southern Caucasus along with the Chechen-Ingush deportations, without however specifically targeting Êzîdîs.

Current status of rights

De jure: Êzîdî identity is not entered on passports (passports have no religious entry since 1997). Êzîdî associations registered (Soyuz Yazidov Rossii in Krasnodar 1997). De facto: generally stable situation. Some Êzîdîs are visible in business; political representation is low.

Target state

Recognition as a religious minority with its own status (comparable to Buddhists). Protection against Russian anti-extremism legislation, which sometimes hits minority religions.

Timeline

1828–1878: first waves from the Caucasus
1944 (Stalin deportations): part of Êzîdî families in the southern Caucasus deported with (Kazakhstan, Siberia)
1991: Soviet dissolution, many Êzîdîs from Armenia/Georgia migrate to Russia
1997: Soyuz Yazidov Rossii founded in Krasnodar
2002 (Census): 31,273 Êzîdîs in Russia
2010 (Census): 40,586
2014: Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Êzîdîs in Sevastopol/Simferopol (small number) under Russian administration
2018: Russia tightens “anti-extremism” law, Êzîdî associations not directly affected, but growing caution
2022 (Ukraine war): Êzîdîs in Russia partly drafted, some families flee to Armenia/Georgia
2021 (Census): 40,488

Persecution + oppression

Historical: Soviet religious suppression. No targeted Êzîdî-specific persecution apart from Stalin’s deportations (collateral). Current: generally stable. The Putin government cultivates a “traditional religions” policy (Orthodox Church favoured), but Êzîdîs do not come into direct conflict.

Government policy

Russia treats Êzîdîs pragmatically as an ethnic minority. No official protection policy, but also no persecution. The Ukraine war 2022 has forced some Êzîdî families to flee westwards, no state aid.

Outlook

Realistic: Êzîdî population in Russia stagnates or declines slightly. Diaspora migration into the EU continues. Worrying: if the Ukraine war escalates, further mobilisation also hits Êzîdî men. Optimistic: no targeted anti-Ezidism from the state.

Sources

Census Russia 2010: gks.ru
Census Russia 2021 (preliminary data): rosstat.gov.ru
Soyuz Yazidov Rossii: yezidi.ru (Krasnodar)
Russian Federal Law “On Freedom of Conscience” (No. 125-FZ, 26.9.1997)
Olga Skripnik “Yazidis of the Russian Caucasus”, Diss. Moscow 2015
USCIRF Annual Report 2024: Russia section
Sefik Tagay/Serhat Ortaç “Die Eziden”: Russia chapter
HRW “Russia: Religious Freedom Trends 2023”

9. Azerbaijan

Population: about 200–500 (no reliable data, Azerbaijan Census 2009 names 7 (!) self-declared Êzîdîs, which is considered drastic under-coverage; diaspora estimates 200–500) Legal status: not recognised. Azerbaijan’s constitution (1995) guarantees religious freedom but registers religious communities strictly under the “On Freedom of Religious Beliefs” law (1992, rev. 2009). Genocide recognition: NO

Historical Êzîdî presence

Êzîdîs in Azerbaijan were historically a small group near the Armenian border (Karabakh region, Nakhichevan). After 1988 (Karabakh conflict) most fled to Armenia or Russia.

Current status of rights

De jure: religious practice only possible via registered communities (according to the 1992 law, considerably tightened 2009). Êzîdîs have no registered community, so de facto a state of lawlessness. De facto: very small, hidden presence. No temples, no public activities.

Target state

Recognition as a religious minority, loosening of the registration requirement, protection for the few remaining families.

Timeline

19th c.: small Êzîdî population in Karabakh
1988–94 (Karabakh conflict): Êzîdîs mostly flee to Armenia
1992: religion law Azerbaijan
2009 (Census): 7 self-declarations, massive under-coverage
2020 (Karabakh War): Azerbaijan reconquers Nagorno-Karabakh, no Êzîdî return

Persecution + oppression

Historical: in the Karabakh conflict Êzîdîs suffered on the Armenian side. Current: de facto invisible. No specific persecution documented, but also no protection.

Government policy

Azerbaijan officially ignores the Êzîdî question entirely.

Outlook

Realistic: Êzîdî presence in Azerbaijan minimal. No recovery expected.

Sources

Constitution of Azerbaijan (1995): president.az/en
Azerbaijan Law “On Freedom of Religious Beliefs” (1992)
US State Department IRF Report Azerbaijan 2024
Pew Research “Religion in Azerbaijan”
Forum 18 “Azerbaijan: Religious Freedom Survey 2023”
ICG “Karabakh and Minorities” 2021

10. Kazakhstan

Population: 2,000–5,000 (no census data; Êzîdîs in Kazakhstan mostly come from Stalin’s deportations 1937–44 and post-Soviet migration) Legal status: no separate religious status. Religious freedom constitutionally, but registration requirement since the “Religion Law” 2011. Genocide recognition: NO

Historical Êzîdî presence

Êzîdîs in Kazakhstan came via three routes: (1) Stalin’s deportations from the southern Caucasus (collateral with Chechen-Ingush 1944); (2) after 1991 as economic migrants from Armenia/Georgia; (3) as refugees from Iraq/Turkey.

Current status of rights

De jure: religious freedom guaranteed; registration requirement makes small communities difficult. De facto: Êzîdîs live dispersed, no central temples, no known own community organisation.

Target state

Recognition as a religion, possible association registration.

Timeline

1944: collateral deportations
1991: independence of Kazakhstan
2011: tightening of religion law

Persecution + oppression

No targeted persecution documented. General restrictions for non-majority religions.

Government policy

Indifferent. No protection, no persecution.

Outlook

Êzîdî presence stable but invisible. Diaspora migration into the EU/Russia continues.

Sources

Constitution of Kazakhstan (1995)
Kazakhstan Religion Law 2011
USCIRF Kazakhstan section 2024
Forum 18 “Kazakhstan Religious Freedom Survey”
Olga Skripnik Diss. 2015 (Kazakhstan chapter)
HRW “Kazakhstan: Religious Restrictions” 2023

11. Ukraine

Population: ~3,000–5,000 (NGO estimates; Ukraine Census 2001 does not record Êzîdîs separately) Legal status: religious freedom constitutional (Art. 35), no specific Êzîdî recognition. Genocide recognition: NO

Historical Êzîdî presence

Êzîdîs in Ukraine are mostly post-1991 immigrants (from Armenia/Georgia/Russia). Concentration in Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odesa, Dnipro.

Current status of rights

De jure: religious freedom, association freedom guaranteed. De facto: small but stable community before 2022. After February 2022 (Russian invasion) many Êzîdîs flee towards Poland, Germany.

Target state

Genocide recognition 2014. Protection status for refugees of Êzîdî origin (especially with a double-persecution history).

Timeline

1991: Êzîdî immigration begins
2014 (Maidan): first Êzîdî families flee to Russia/EU
2022 (24 February): Russian invasion, Êzîdîs flee to Poland, DE, RO
2024: Ukrainian Êzîdî community in Germany recognisable

Persecution + oppression

Historical: no targeted Êzîdî-specific persecution Current: war-related displacement. Êzîdî men of Ukrainian citizenship drafted into the military.

Government policy

Ukraine pragmatic, no anti-Ezidism, but also no particular protection.

Outlook

War permanently destabilising. Êzîdî diaspora in the EU grows.

Sources

Constitution of Ukraine (1996) Art. 35
USCIRF Ukraine section 2024
UNHCR Ukraine Refugee Reports 2022–2024
Pew “Religion in Ukraine”
HRW Ukraine 2023
Forum 18 Ukraine

12. Germany (~250,000, largest diaspora worldwide)

Population: 200,000–250,000 (ZÊD 2024; Bundestag Drucksache 20/5228 names “about 250,000”; conservative estimates from ~100,000); thus the largest diaspora worldwide, larger than the population in the Iraqi heartland. Legal status: religious freedom (Basic Law Art. 4), Êzîdîs recognised as a religious community, but NOT as a Corporation under Public Law (KdöR) (an application is pending in Lower Saxony since 2018). Genocide recognition: 19 January 2023, German Bundestag, Drucksache 20/5228 “Protection of the Êzîdîs and recognition of the genocide”

Historical Êzîdî presence

First Êzîdîs came in the late 1960s as guest workers from Turkey (provinces of Mêrdîn, Diyarbakır, Batman). Larger migration waves: 1980 (Turkish military coup), 1990s (PKK conflict), 2014–2017 (Daesh genocide Iraq/Syria). Main settlement areas: Lower Saxony (Hannover, Celle, Oldenburg, Wolfenbüttel), Baden-Württemberg (Stuttgart, Pforzheim), North Rhine-Westphalia (Bielefeld, Düsseldorf), Bavaria (Augsburg).

Current status of rights

De jure: religious freedom fully guaranteed (GG Art. 4). Federal Constitutional Court judgment of 5.10.1992 (case 2 BvR 1968/91): Êzîdîs in Turkey have a claim to asylum since they are exposed to group persecution, landmark ruling. Temple-building permitted. Religious education possible (Lower Saxony school trial since 2015). Mîr secretariat Hannover active since 2019. De facto: stable, visible, growing community. ZÊD (Central Council of the Êzîdîs in Germany) represents officially. Own associations, temples (e.g. Lalîş Centre Celle, Quba Şîxadî Hannover), cemeteries (problem-oriented, burial with coffin vs. without).

Target state

Fully met except for KdöR status. Improvement potential: nationwide religious education, own Êzîdî chairs (Göttingen from 2024), protection from imports of Daesh veterans.

Timeline

1961–1973 (guest worker phase): first Êzîdîs from Turkey
1980: Turkish military coup, asylum waves
1992 (5 October): BVerfG judgment case 2 BvR 1968/91, Êzîdîs in Turkey = group persecution
1996: ZÊD founded
2014–2017: about 50,000 protection-seekers of Êzîdî origin from Iraq/Syria
2015: Lower Saxony special quota: 1,000 traumatised Êzîdî women + children (programme “Special Quota Project”)
2019: Mîr secretariat Germany in Hannover
2023 (19 January): Bundestag recognises the genocide, Drucksache 20/5228, unanimous resolution
2024 (February): Êzîdî Forum for Religion and Identity opens in Berlin
2021 (25 October): the Higher Regional Court (OLG) of Munich sentences the IS returnee Jennifer W. (Jennifer Wenisch) to 10 years in prison for crimes against humanity and aiding and abetting the murder of an enslaved 5-year-old Êzîdî girl, one of the first court rulings worldwide on IS crimes against the Êzîdî

Persecution + oppression

Historical: no persecution by the German state. Nazi era: too few Êzîdîs present, no specific persecution records. Current: social discrimination (school, labour market), occasional temple desecrations (e.g. Celle 2020), threat by Daesh sympathisers who migrated to Germany (several criminal proceedings).

Government policy

German politics actively pro-Êzîdî since 2014. Lower Saxony special quota 2015 under MP Stephan Weil (SPD) is an international best-practice example. Bundestag resolution 2023 (Drucksache 20/5228) includes: (1) recognition of the genocide, (2) demand for the federal government to support Iraqi prosecution, (3) aid programmes for reconstruction of Şingal, (4) right to remain for Êzîdî refugees. Prosecution by the Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office Karlsruhe (several Daesh trials, Frankfurt case 5 OJs 11/17, BGH judgments 2023–24).

Outlook

Realistic: Germany remains the most important diaspora country. Êzîdî identity is asserted in the 2nd, 3rd generation, language loss is the biggest worry. Worrying: right-wing extremist tendencies also affect Êzîdîs. AfD voters increasingly reject protection quotas. Optimistic: academisation progresses (Göttingen, Berlin, Bielefeld), an own theology emerges.

Sources

Basic Law of the FRG, Art. 4 (religious freedom)
BVerfG 2 BvR 1968/91 (5.10.1992)
Bundestag Drucksache 20/5228 (19.1.2023): bundestag.de/dokumente
Lower Saxony Ministry of Interior “Special quota for traumatised Yazidi women” (2015–2018)
ZÊD (Central Council of the Yazidis in Germany) activity reports 2020–2024, ezidi.de
Sefik Tagay/Serhat Ortaç “Die Eziden und das Ezidentum” (2016)
Düzen Tekkal “Deutschland ist bedroht” (2016, Edition Körber)
BGH judgments 3 StR 564/19 (slavery proceedings)
Andrea C. Lange “Die Êzîden in Deutschland” (Diss. Hamburg, 2022)
University of Göttingen: Yazidi studies chair (established 2024)

13. Sweden

Population: 20,000–25,000 (ZÊD Sverige 2023; Riksdag Drucksache 2022/23:RR3 names “around 20,000”) Legal status: religious freedom constitutional (Regeringsformen 2:1). Êzîdîs registered as a religious community. The Swedish Religion Ministry has listed Êzîdîs as a recognised religious minority since 2018. Genocide recognition: 22 March 2023, Riksdag officially recognises the 2014 genocide (Riksdagsbeslut 2022/23:UU14, unanimous)

Historical Êzîdî presence

Êzîdîs in Sweden came from the 1970s onwards from Turkey, larger waves in the 1980s and 1990s from Turkey/Syria, then from 2014+ from Iraq. Concentration: Stockholm, Södertälje, Gothenburg, Malmö, Örebro.

Current status of rights

De jure: religious freedom in full, association registration permitted. De facto: active community. Own temples/meeting places. Own associations (Yezidiska Föreningen i Sverige, Yezidisk-Svenska Riksförbundet).

Target state

Fully met. Improvement: Swedish textbooks with correct Êzîdî presentation (reforms 2022 completed).

Timeline

1970s: first Êzîdîs from Turkey
1980 (coup): asylum wave
2014: protection-seekers from Iraq
2016 (8 March): Swedish foreign minister Margot Wallström declares the genocide “etniskt rensning”
2023 (22 March): Riksdag officially recognises the genocide
2024: Swedish police opens a special investigation unit for Daesh veterans

Persecution + oppression

No state persecution. Sporadic racist attacks.

Government policy

Actively protecting. NATO accession 2024 has eased Turkish blackmail against Swedish Êzîdîs.

Outlook

Stable diaspora.

Sources

Regeringsformen 2:1 (Swedish constitution)
Riksdagsbeslut 2022/23:UU14: riksdagen.se
Yezidiska Föreningen i Sverige: yezidi.se
Sveriges Television “Yezidernas Sverige” (doc. 2018)
USCIRF Sweden section 2024
Pew “Religion in Sweden”

14. France

Population: 5,000–8,000 (FYF France 2024; no official census data on religion in France, due to laicism) Legal status: laicism (Loi du 9 décembre 1905 concernant la séparation des Églises et de l’État). Religious freedom guaranteed by the 1958 constitution + the 1789 Declaration of Human Rights. Religion is not recorded in the census. Genocide recognition: 6 December 2016, Assemblée Nationale (résolution n° 565), 8 December 2016, Sénat (resolution unanimous)

Historical Êzîdî presence

Êzîdîs in France are a relatively young diaspora. First families came in the late 1990s from Turkey and Iraq. Larger wave 2014–2017 through the Daesh genocide. Main centres: Île-de-France (Paris, Saint-Denis, Sarcelles), Lyon, Marseille, Toulouse, Bordeaux. Unlike in Germany, there is no concentrated Êzîdî region, the community is distributed across urban agglomerations.

Current status of rights

De jure: religious freedom fully guaranteed. Association law of 1901 allows Êzîdî associations (several registered: “Association des Yézidis de France” in Paris, “Yezidis Lyon”, “Yezidis France Toulouse”). Asylum law for Êzîdîs from Iraq/Turkey is generally granted, OFPRA (Office français de protection des réfugiés et apatrides) has classified Êzîdîs as a “group of particular protection” since 2015. De facto: the community is organised but smaller and less visible than in Germany. No temple-building yet (as of 2026). Êzîdî cultural events take place in Parisian suburban communities. Academic research: EHESS Paris has had a Êzîdî studies focus since 2018 under Estelle Amy de la Bretèque.

Target state

Eased family reunification procedures, protection against the return of Daesh veterans (raised in several French criminal proceedings), own Êzîdî cultural centres with state funding, academic chairs.

Timeline

Late 1990s: first Êzîdî families (asylum from Turkey)
2014: protection wave after the Daesh genocide in Iraq, OFPRA special protocol
2016 (6 December): Assemblée Nationale adopts résolution n° 565, “Reconnaissance du génocide perpétré par Daech contre les Chrétiens et autres minorités ethniques et religieuses d’Orient”
2018: EHESS Paris, Êzîdî studies programme launched
2020: Paris trial against several Daesh returnees, Êzîdî enslavement recognised as a crime against humanity
20 March 2026 (Cour d’assises Paris): Sabri Essid (Daesh man, brother-in-law of the Toulouse 2012 murderer Mohamed Merah) sentenced in absentia to life imprisonment for genocide and crimes against humanity against Êzîdî women, France’s first genocide verdict

Persecution + oppression

Historical: no persecution in France. Current: individual assaults by Islamist circles on Êzîdî refugees documented. French police react in principle, but more slowly than in Germany/the Netherlands.

Government policy

French government active pro-Êzîdî since 2014. Foreign ministers Laurent Fabius (2014) and later Jean-Yves Le Drian (2018) publicly in solidarity. The Macron administration supports financially the reconstruction in Şingal (UNDP projects). The French military flew air strikes against Daesh from 2014–17 within Operation Chammal, direct military contribution to Êzîdî liberation.

Outlook

Realistic: the French Êzîdî community grows slowly. No larger temple in the planning. Daesh criminal proceedings continue. Optimistic: academic research at EHESS/Sorbonne grows. Worrying: French right and Rassemblement National (Le Pen) increasingly asylum-critical, protection policy could come under pressure in the medium term.

Sources

Assemblée Nationale Résolution n° 565 (6.12.2016), assemblee-nationale.fr
Sénat Résolution équivalent (8.12.2016)
Loi du 9 décembre 1905 (laicism)
OFPRA Annual Reports 2015–2024: ofpra.gouv.fr
Le Monde coverage of the Paris Sabri Essid trial (verdict 20 March 2026)
Le Figaro “Yézidis en France” (reportage series 2018–2024)
Estelle Amy de la Bretèque EHESS: Yezidi Studies Working Papers
FYF France Country Update 2024
USCIRF France section 2024
Pew Research “Religion in France” (2023)

15. Netherlands

Population: 3,000–5,000 (ZÊD-Nederland 2024; Free Yezidi Foundation Netherlands names “around 4,000”) Legal status: religious freedom (Grondwet Art. 6). Êzîdîs as a religious community can form associations; specific state recognition as “kerkgenootschap” possible but not yet applied for. Genocide recognition: 5 July 2021, Tweede Kamer resolution 32735-323 (motion van der Staaij/CU + ChristenUnie; unanimously adopted)

Historical Êzîdî presence

The Netherlands has a smaller Êzîdî diaspora than Germany. Migration waves came from Turkey (late 1980s, especially from Mêrdîn province), Iraq (1991 Gulf War, 2014 Daesh genocide), Syria (from 2012). Concentration: Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague, Utrecht, Eindhoven, Tilburg. A small but vocal community.

Current status of rights

De jure: religious freedom guaranteed; association registration happens; Êzîdî asylum is systematically granted (IND decision 2014+, Êzîdîs from Iraq/Syria classified as a “special group”). De facto: the Free Yezidi Foundation (FYF) is based in the Netherlands (The Hague region) and works internationally. ZÊD-Nederland organises community events.

Target state

Fully met. Improvement: specific Dutch academic Êzîdî studies (so far mainly diaspora studies at the universities of Amsterdam and Tilburg).

Timeline

1980s: first Êzîdî asylum waves from Turkey
1991 (Gulf War): protection-seekers from Iraq
2014: Daesh genocide, increased reception
2019: Free Yezidi Foundation (FYF) branch in The Hague
2021 (5 July): Tweede Kamer resolution 32735-323, genocide recognition
2022: ICC The Hague opens a preliminary investigation into Daesh crimes, FYF provides evidence
2024 (12.): Rechtbank Den Haag case 09/847156-22, Dutch Daesh female returnee sentenced to 7 years for Êzîdî enslavement (precedent in NL justice)

Persecution + oppression

Historical: no persecution by the Dutch state. Current: sporadic social prejudice. Daesh returnees with Dutch passports are prosecuted.

Government policy

Dutch government active. The foreign ministry co-financed a “Yezidi Protection Fund” in 2014. The Hague, as the seat of many international tribunals, plays a central role in global prosecution.

Outlook

Realistic: stable, well-organised small diaspora. FYF will remain an international base. Optimistic: ICC preliminary investigation could lead to recognition under international law.

Sources

Grondwet voor het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden Art. 6
Tweede Kamer 32735-323 (5.7.2021): tweedekamer.nl
Free Yezidi Foundation Annual Report 2024: freeyezidi.org
Rechtbank Den Haag case 09/847156-22 (judgment 12/2024)
IND “Country of Origin Iraq” Reports 2014–2024
ZÊD-Nederland reports 2020–2024
NRC Handelsblad reportages Yezidis 2014–2024
USCIRF Netherlands section 2024

16. Belgium

Population: 1,500–3,000 (ZÊD-Belgique 2024; FYF estimate) Legal status: religious freedom (Belgian constitution Art. 19, 20, 21). Religious recognition tiered: Belgium officially recognises 6 religions (Catholicism, Protestantism, Anglicanism, Judaism, Islam, Orthodoxy), Êzîdîs NOT in this category, but free as a religious community. Genocide recognition: 1 March 2022, Chambre des représentants resolution 55K2602 (initiated by Ecolo-Groen + Open VLD, adopted by a broad majority)

Historical Êzîdî presence

Small diaspora since the 1990s from Turkey and Iraq. Concentration in Brussels, Antwerp, Liège, Mechelen.

Current status of rights

De jure: religious freedom guaranteed; association freedom; special religious recognition category not granted (analogous to Hinduism, Buddhism). De facto: active community organisation, several Êzîdî associations. Belgium as EU seat is important for Êzîdî lobbying work at the EU level (EU Parliament resolutions).

Timeline

1990s: first Êzîdîs in Belgium
2016: EU Parliament resolution genocide (Belgium initiative important)
2022 (1 March): Chambre recognises the genocide
11/2025 (Brussels tribunal): Djedou (Tarik Jadaoun, “Abu Hamza al-Belgiki”, Daesh captain, dual citizenship FR-BE) sentenced to life imprisonment for Daesh crimes including Êzîdî enslavement, important precedent

Government policy

Active prosecution. The EU diplomatic apex in Brussels makes Belgium a central place for Êzîdî lobbying.

Sources

Belgian Constitution Art. 19–21
Chambre des représentants 55K2602 (1.3.2022): dekamer.be
Cour d’assises Bruxelles judgments 2025
EU Parliament Resolution 2016/2980 (15.2.2016)
ZÊD-Belgique reports
USCIRF Belgium 2024
Yazda Brussels Office statements

17. United Kingdom

Population: 1,000–2,000 (Yazda UK 2024; no census data, since the UK census does not record Êzîdîs separately, they fall under “Other Religion” or “Kurdish”) Legal status: religious freedom (Human Rights Act 1998 incorporates Art. 9 ECHR; Equality Act 2010 protects against religious discrimination) Genocide recognition: 20 April 2016, House of Commons resolution unanimous (initiated by Fiona Bruce MP, cross-party motion). House of Lords followed in 2018. The UK was thus one of the first Western countries with parliamentary recognition, before the Bundestag (2023).

Historical Êzîdî presence

Êzîdîs in the UK came from the 1990s from Turkey and Iraq. Main centres: London (especially Haringey, Enfield, Hackney), Birmingham, Sheffield, Manchester. A smaller, urban-scattered community.

Current status of rights

De jure: fully protected. Asylum law for Êzîdîs from Iraq/Syria is generally granted, Home Office Country Policy and Information Notes (CPIN) on Iraq/Yezidis classify them as a “risk group”. De facto: small but active community. Yazda has a UK office in London. ZÊD-UK coordinates diaspora activities.

Target state

The UK government has recognised parliamentarily but the executive is hesitant. The Foreign Office has considered “Genocide Determination” legally contested as a concept; Prime Minister Theresa May opposed it in 2016.

Timeline

1990s: Êzîdî asylum from Turkey
2014–2017: Daesh genocide, reception of refugees
2016 (20 April): House of Commons resolution
2017: UK Special Forces active in anti-Daesh operations, indirect support for YBŞ/Peshmerga
2018: House of Lords genocide recognition
2023: special visa programmes for Êzîdî refugees

Government policy

The UK was a pioneer in parliamentary recognition in 2016. The UK government has, however, hesitated for years to implement “Genocide Determination” at the executive level, that is only possible through courts or international tribunals (UK Foreign Office position). UK Special Forces (SAS) and Royal Air Force supported the anti-Daesh coalition militarily.

Outlook

Stable small diaspora. Brexit has tightened asylum policy.

Sources

House of Commons Resolution (20.4.2016): Hansard HC Vol 608 Col 996
House of Lords Resolution (2018)
Human Rights Act 1998
Home Office CPIN Iraq: Yezidis (2022, updated 2024)
Yazda UK Annual Report 2024
The Guardian reportages 2014–2024
Fiona Bruce MP: Parliamentary Statements Archive
USCIRF UK section 2024
House of Lords International Relations Committee “UK and the Future of the Middle East” (2018)

18. Norway

Population: 1,500–2,500 (UDI estimate 2023; ZÊD-Norge names about 2,000) Legal status: religious freedom (Grunnloven §16, rev. 2012 abolished the state church tie) Genocide recognition: NO (as of 2026). Stortinget had in summer 2023 debated a motion (document 8:124 S 2022–23) of the SV (Sosialistisk Venstreparti) and Venstre, but adjourned. Foreign Minister Anniken Huitfeldt (Arbeiderpartiet) referred to “international definition practice”, similar argument to the UK Foreign Office.

Historical Êzîdî presence

Êzîdîs in Norway came via the UN resettlement programme (UNHCR), Norway has regularly high resettlement quotas. Concentration: Oslo, Trondheim, Bergen, Stavanger. Smaller communities in Hamar and Drammen.

Current status of rights

De jure: religious freedom guaranteed. Êzîdî asylum granted for Iraq/Syria refugees. De facto: active UDI reception policy 2014–18 brought several hundred families. Norway set up a “Special Quota for Yezidi Women and Children Survivors” in 2018 (analogous to Canada).

Target state

Stortinget genocide recognition is outstanding. Eased family reunification procedures desirable.

Timeline

2014: Daesh genocide, UDI opens protection paths
2018: Special Quota for Êzîdî Survivors
2023 (summer): Stortinget adjourns genocide recognition
2024: ZÊD-Norge founded

Government policy

Norway is active in reception, reserved in parliamentary symbol politics. Norwegian money flowed into NGO support (Yazda, FYF, UN programmes).

Sources

Grunnloven §16
Stortingsdokument 8:124 S (2022–23)
UDI “Yazidi Resettlement Programme” (2018+)
USCIRF Norway 2024
Aftenposten reportages 2014–2024
ZÊD-Norge 2024
Norwegian Refugee Council Reports

19. Denmark

Population: 500–1,000 (ZÊD-Danmark estimate 2024; no census data) Legal status: religious freedom (Grundlov §67), but Folkekirken (Lutheran) is the state church §4 Genocide recognition: NO (as of 2026)

Historical Êzîdî presence

Very small diaspora, mostly immigrated after 2014. Concentration: Aarhus, Aalborg, Copenhagen.

Current status of rights

De jure: religious freedom. Êzîdî asylum is granted. De facto: small community. Denmark has, since 2015, considerably tightened asylum policy (“Jewellery Law” 2016, “paradigm shift” asylum 2019).

Government policy

Limited reception. No parliamentary resolution. Denmark pursues a very strict asylum policy under S+V governments, which directly affects Êzîdî families. 2021–22: some Êzîdî refugees were confronted with Iraqi asylum revocation programmes (Denmark declared the Baghdad region “safe”, which did not concern Êzîdîs, but still caused uncertainty).

Outlook

Diaspora remains small. Political climate asylum-restrictive.

Sources

Grundlov §67 + §4
Folketinget B resolution database: folketinget.dk
DRC Danish Refugee Council Reports 2014–2024
USCIRF Denmark 2024
Politiken reportages Yezidis Denmark
ZÊD-Danmark statements 2023–2024

20. Austria

Population: 3,000–5,000 (ZÊD-Österreich 2024; some estimates up to 8,000 including irregular residence) Legal status: religious freedom (StGG 1867 Art. 14 + Constitutional Law Art. 9). Êzîdîs as a religion free, but NOT as a “legally recognised religious society” (16 recognised since 1874, most recently Alevis 2013), Êzîdîs have applied for the status of “registered religious confessional community” (per ZÊD, procedure pending at the Kultusamt at BMBWF since 2018). Genocide recognition: 27 April 2022, Nationalrat unanimous (motion 235/E XXVII. GP, all parties)

Historical Êzîdî presence

Êzîdîs in Austria came from the 1990s from Turkey, larger waves from 2014 from Iraq/Syria. Concentration: Vienna (especially districts of Favoriten, Simmering, Donaustadt), Linz, Salzburg, Innsbruck.

Current status of rights

De jure: religious freedom guaranteed; association freedom; asylum law granted. Registered religious confessional community status pending. De facto: Viennese Êzîdî Centre active. Êzîdî religious instruction introduced experimentally in some Vienna schools.

Timeline

1990s: first Êzîdî asylum waves
2014–17: Daesh genocide, increased reception
2018: ZÊD-Österreich applies for status “registered religious confessional community”
2022 (27 April): Nationalrat genocide recognition 235/E
2024: Viennese Êzîdî Forum established

Government policy

Active protection policy, parliamentary recognition. The Kultusamt procedure regarding official religion status is dragging on (as of 2026 not yet completed).

Sources

StGG 1867 Art. 14
B-VG Art. 9
Nationalrat Entschließung 235/E XXVII. GP (27.4.2022), parlament.gv.at
ZÊD-Österreich reports 2020–2024
Der Standard reportages Yezidis
Religion in Austria statistics 2021
USCIRF Austria 2024
BMBWF Kultusamt status proceedings files (partial publication)

21. Switzerland

Population: 1,000–2,000 (SEM asylum statistics cumulative 2014–2024; ZÊD-Schweiz names about 1,500) Legal status: religious freedom (Federal Constitution Art. 15). Religion is a cantonal matter, cantons can recognise religious communities “under public law” (Zurich, Bern, Basel-Stadt have different models). Genocide recognition: NO (as of 2026; a motion 23.3641 “Recognition of the genocide against the Êzîdîs” by National Councillor Yvonne Bürgin (Mitte) was submitted in 2023 and pending in the procedure)

Historical Êzîdî presence

Êzîdîs in Switzerland: small diaspora, mostly from Turkey (1980s) and Iraq (2014+). Concentration: Zurich, Bern, Basel, Geneva, Lucerne.

Current status of rights

De jure: religious freedom in full. Asylum is granted. De facto: active association structures but no own temple.

Government policy

The Federal Council (Swiss government) declared in 2018 in response to an interpellation that Switzerland applies the UN genocide definition and “assigns the Daesh crimes their character”, but no separate parliamentary recognition. Notable: the Swiss Federal Court has confirmed Êzîdî asylum in several rulings (e.g. BGE E-7138/2017).

Outlook

Small, stable diaspora. Motion procedure could be decided in 2026/27.

Sources

Federal Constitution Art. 15
Parlament.ch Motion 23.3641 (Bürgin): parlament.ch
SEM asylum statistics 2014–2024: sem.admin.ch
Federal Court E-7138/2017 (Yazidi asylum jurisprudence)
Neue Zürcher Zeitung “Jesiden in der Schweiz” reports
ZÊD-Schweiz reports
USCIRF Switzerland 2024

22. Italy

Population: 500–1,000 Legal status: religious freedom (Cost. Art. 19) Genocide recognition: NO (as of 2026)

Government policy

Papal diplomacy important, Pope Francis visited Erbil in 2021, met Êzîdî representatives.

Sources

Costituzione Art. 19
Camera dei Deputati database
Vatican reports 2021
USCIRF Italy 2024

23. Spain

Population: <500 Legal status: religious freedom (Const. Art. 16) Genocide recognition: NO

Sources

Constitución Española Art. 16
Congreso de los Diputados database
USCIRF Spain 2024

24. Greece

Population: <500 Legal status: religious freedom (constitution Art. 13) Genocide recognition: NO

Sources

Constitution of Greece Art. 13
Hellenic Parliament Database
USCIRF Greece 2024

25. USA (Lincoln, Nebraska; Houston, TX; Phoenix, AZ)

Population: 8,000–12,000 (Yazda US 2024; Lincoln Nebraska alone ~3,000–4,000, the largest Êzîdî city in the USA) Legal status: religious freedom (1st Amendment of the US Constitution). Êzîdîs as a religious group free; IRS recognition as 501©(3) religious organisation for Yazda and some local associations. Genocide recognition: 17 March 2017, US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson formally declares “Daesh (so-called Islamic State) is responsible for genocide against Yazidi, Christians, and Shi’a Muslims in areas it controls”. This was preceded by: House Resolution 75 (14.3.2016, 393-0 passed, unanimous), Senate Concurrent Resolution 71 (July 2016).

Historical Êzîdî presence

The first larger Êzîdî community in Lincoln (Nebraska) emerged in 1997, via US military interpreters from 1991 operations (Operation Provide Comfort in Kurdistan). Lincoln was chosen by Lutheran Family Services as a resettlement location. Today Lincoln is “Yazidi Capital of America” with its own Êzîdî population concentration in the neighbourhoods of Belmont and North Lincoln. Yazda has its US headquarters in Houston, TX. Further communities: Phoenix (AZ), Sioux Falls (SD), Buffalo (NY), Tampa (FL).

Current status of rights

De jure: 1st Amendment protection in full. SIV programme (Special Immigrant Visa) for Afghan and Iraqi US employees includes Êzîdî interpreters. Asylum grants after the 2017 genocide intensified. De facto: active community in Lincoln (own restaurants, associations, Lincoln Public Schools programmes for Êzîdî children). Yazda Secretary General Nadia Murad (Nobel Peace Prize 2018) operates US-based.

Target state

Eased family reunification procedures, permanent refugee caps for Êzîdî survivors, protection against anti-immigrant rhetoric.

Timeline

1991 (Operation Provide Comfort): US military interpreters from Kurdistan, some Êzîdîs
1996–1997: first families in Lincoln (Lutheran Family Services)
2014 (8 August): President Obama authorises air strikes and humanitarian aid for Êzîdîs on Mount Şingal, direct US intervention to prevent genocide
2014 (9 August): US Air Force drops supplies; US special forces coordinate with YPG/Peshmerga
2015: Yazda US founded (Houston)
2016 (14 March): House Resolution 75 (393-0)
2016 (July): Senate Concurrent Resolution 71
2017 (17 March): Tillerson genocide declaration
2018 (5 October): Nadia Murad receives the Nobel Peace Prize (jointly with Denis Mukwege)
2018–21 (Trump administration): refugee caps drastically reduced (from 110,000 to 18,000), Êzîdîs indirectly affected, fewer new admissions
2021–25 (Biden administration): refugee caps raised again
2024: Nadia’s Initiative (Nadia Murad’s foundation) expands humanitarian programmes in Şingal

Persecution + oppression

Historical: none in the USA. Current: social discrimination in the Midwest occasionally; Trump-era rhetoric against migrants affected Êzîdîs indirectly.

Government policy

The USA was militarily and politically central for Êzîdî protection in 2014. The Obama doctrine of “humanitarian intervention” was explicitly applied to Şingal on 8.8.2014. State Department recognition in 2017 under Tillerson was a milestone. The Biden administration finances UN programmes on Şingal reconstruction. USAID funds for Êzîdî NGOs (Yazda, FYF) are significant.

Outlook

Realistic: Lincoln remains a central diaspora city. Nadia Murad and Yazda have an international voice. Worrying: Trump re-election 2024 reduces humanitarian programmes again, refugee caps lowered. Optimistic: the Lincoln community grows in the 2nd and 3rd generation, higher education rises.

Sources

US Constitution 1st Amendment
House Resolution 75 (14.3.2016, 114th Congress)
Senate Concurrent Resolution 71 (July 2016)
US State Department Statement Tillerson (17.3.2017)
Obama statement (8.8.2014): whitehouse.gov archive
Yazda US Annual Report 2024: yazda.org
Nadia’s Initiative Annual Report 2024: nadiasinitiative.org
Lincoln Journal Star Yazidi coverage 2014–2024
Lincoln Public Schools “English Language Learners Yezidi Cohort” Reports
USCIRF Annual Report 2024: uscirf.gov
Pew Research “Yazidis in America” (2017)

26. Canada (Winnipeg, Toronto, London ON, Calgary)

Population: 5,000–8,000 (Operation Ezra Reports 2024; Statistics Canada 2021 census not separately recorded due to small numbers, Êzîdîs fall under “Yazidi” as “Other Religious Group”) Legal status: religious freedom (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1982, Sec. 2(a)) Genocide recognition: 25 October 2016, House of Commons Motion M-47 (313-0, unanimous); 8 June 2017, Senate confirmation. Canada’s recognition was one of the first worldwide.

Historical Êzîdî presence

Êzîdîs in Canada are a post-2014 diaspora. Before the Daesh genocide fewer than 100 Êzîdîs lived in Canada. “Operation Ezra” Winnipeg started in 2015 as an unusual Jewish-Êzîdî solidarity initiative of the Winnipeg Jewish Community (Belle Jarniewski, Nafiya Naso a.o.), donation-financed private sponsorship. The federal government’s special programme “Survivors of Daesh” (Justin Trudeau, IRCC under Ahmed Hussen) officially took in 1,200+ Sinjar survivors in 2017–2019 (mostly women and children with particularly heavy trauma history). London (Ontario), Toronto, Calgary, Winnipeg are main centres.

Current status of rights

De jure: Charter protection in full, Canadian citizenship eased for former refugees. De facto: active community organisation. Êzîdî cultural centre Winnipeg, Êzîdî school programmes.

Target state

Extension of reception programmes for outstanding survivor families (several hundred applications open since the programme ended in 2019).

Timeline

Before 2014: <100 Êzîdîs in Canada
2015: Operation Ezra Winnipeg launches
2016 (25 October): House of Commons M-47 (313-0)
2017 (February): federal government announces “Survivors of Daesh” programme
2017–2019: 1,200+ Êzîdî survivors taken in
2018 (10 December): Nadia Murad visits Ottawa, hearing at the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee
2019: programme officially ended, remaining families still in processing
2022: Ontario province supports the London Êzîdî community with a special fund
2024: Operation Ezra 10-year anniversary, further wave of private sponsorships

Persecution + oppression

None in Canada. Sporadic discrimination in schools (London ON school initiatives 2018).

Government policy

The Trudeau government active pro-Êzîdî. The special programme 2017–19 is an international best-practice example (together with Lower Saxony 2015). Foreign Minister Chrystia Freeland (2017–19) publicly in solidarity. IRCC (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada) has its own country-of-origin reports on Êzîdîs in Iraq.

Outlook

Realistic: stable, growing diaspora. The Operation Ezra model is cited worldwide as an example. Optimistic: Êzîdî-background politicians in Canadian parliaments expected (2030s). Worrying: a possible Conservative government might not continue survivors programmes.

Sources

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Sec. 2(a)
House of Commons Motion M-47 (25.10.2016): ourcommons.ca
Operation Ezra Annual Reports 2015–2024: operationezra.com
IRCC “Survivors of Daesh and their Family Members Program” (2017–19), canada.ca
Senate Foreign Affairs Committee Hearings 2018 (Nadia Murad)
CBC News coverage Yezidis Canada 2014–2024
Globe and Mail Yezidi reportages
Winnipeg Free Press “Operation Ezra” Reporting Series
USCIRF Canada section 2024
Statistics Canada Census 2021 Religious Affiliation

27. Australia (Armidale NSW; Toowoomba QLD; Wagga Wagga NSW)

Population: 4,123 (Australian Bureau of Statistics Census 2021, for the first time Êzîdîs listed separately in the Australian Standard Classification of Religious Groups ASCRG); NGO estimates up to 6,000 Legal status: religious freedom (Australian Constitution Section 116) Genocide recognition: 1 September 2021, Australian House of Representatives (Federation Chamber motion, brought by Adam Bandt MP, Greens; cross-party); Senate preceded on 24 August 2021.

Historical Êzîdî presence

Êzîdîs in Australia are a post-2014 diaspora. First families came via UNHCR resettlement after 2014. Australia chose the regional town Armidale (New South Wales, ~26,000 inhabitants) as the main settlement location, one of the most successful regional integration achievements worldwide. Toowoomba (Queensland), Wagga Wagga (NSW), Coffs Harbour (NSW) are other centres. Sydney and Melbourne have smaller communities.

Current status of rights

De jure: religious freedom in full. Êzîdîs in the Census 2021 recorded for the first time as their own religion (ASCRG code 6111 “Yezidi”), administrative milestone. De facto: the Armidale model is internationally cited as a model: municipal integration infrastructure (language courses, trauma therapy, job-matching, school programmes) was specifically built up.

Target state

Extension of humanitarian programme quotas, acceleration of family reunification.

Timeline

2014: Daesh genocide, UNHCR resettlement proposals to Australia
2015: first Êzîdî families in Australia
2016: Armidale chosen as regional integration location (Settlement Services International + Armidale Regional Council)
2017–2019: ~1,000+ Êzîdîs settled in Armidale
2021 (24 August): Australian Senate recognises the genocide
2021 (1 September): House of Representatives follows
2021 (Census): 4,123 Êzîdîs officially registered (ASCRG 6111)
2024: the Armidale model is documented as a success in studies of the University of New England (UNE)

Persecution + oppression

None. Occasional social discrimination in regions, solved through municipal integration work.

Government policy

The Australian federal government (Liberal–Coalition 2013–2022, Labor 2022+) has consistently supported Êzîdî reception. Special quotas in the “Special Humanitarian Programme” (SHP) and “Refugee and Humanitarian Programme”. Armidale local politics (Mayor Sam Coupland et al.) has established regional best-practice.

Outlook

Stable, growing community. Armidale will long-term remain “little Şingal” in Down Under. The 2nd generation grows up bilingually.

Sources

Australian Constitution Sec. 116
ABS Census 2021 (Religion Codes ASCRG 6111): abs.gov.au
House of Representatives Hansard 1.9.2021
Senate Hansard 24.8.2021
Adam Bandt MP Statement 1.9.2021: adambandt.com
Settlement Services International Reports
Armidale Regional Council “Yezidi Community Integration” Reports 2017–2024
UNE Centre for Rural Criminology “Armidale Refugee Resettlement Studies”
USCIRF Australia 2024
ABC News reportages Yezidis Armidale 2017–2024

28. Brazil

Population: <300 Legal status: religious freedom (Const. 1988, Art. 5) Genocide recognition: NO

Government policy

Indifferent. Small diaspora in São Paulo, Curitiba.

Sources

Brazil Constitution Art. 5
Itamaraty Diplomatic Records
USCIRF Brazil 2024

29. Argentina

Population: <200 Legal status: religious freedom (Const. 1853, Art. 14) Genocide recognition: NO

Sources

Constitución Argentina Art. 14
Cancillería Records
USCIRF Argentina 2024

30. Israel

Population: <100 (mostly immigrated from Iraq/Syria via third countries) Legal status: religious freedom (Basic Law: Human Dignity 1992) Genocide recognition: 21 November 2018, Knesset REJECTED 59-38

Government policy

Astonishing course of events: as early as 2015 the Knesset had a motion to recognise the genocide put to a vote. Deputy Foreign Minister Tzipi Hotovely (Likud) argued against the official recognition, verbatim: “Israel should recognise the genocide against the Êzîdîs, but it is politically difficult.” The motion was rejected by 59 to 38 votes. Hotovely’s reason: Israel could not “officially recognise the genocide several times”, and it was a matter of foreign relations complications with Turkey/Saudi Arabia (Times of Israel, 22.11.2018).

This rejection was criticised by Êzîdî activists worldwide, Israel of all countries, with its own Holocaust history, remains silent about a contemporaneous genocide against a monotheistic minority.

Outlook

Realistic: Israel will probably not recognise the genocide in this legislature. Political solidarity remains symbolic.

Sources

Times of Israel “Knesset rejects Yazidi genocide recognition” (22.11.2018)
Haaretz coverage 21.11.2018
Jerusalem Post “Yazidi Genocide Debate” 2018
Knesset protocol 21.11.2018
USCIRF Israel 2024
Tzipi Hotovely Statements Archive

31. Japan

Population: <50 Legal status: religious freedom (constitution Art. 20) Genocide recognition: NO

Historical Êzîdî presence

First Êzîdîs came in 2015–17 as refugees, some via UN resettlement programmes. Very small community in Tokyo.

Government policy

Japan asylum policy is restrictive, few Êzîdî refugees received residence. Active however at the donor conference for Iraq/Şingal reconstruction (2017–2024).

Sources

Japan Constitution Art. 20
MOJ Refugee Statistics Japan 2014–2024
UNHCR Japan Reports
USCIRF Japan 2024

32. United Arab Emirates (transit)

Population: 100–500 (guest workers; no permanent community) Legal status: religious freedom restricted; temple-building not possible. Genocide recognition: NO

Government policy

The UAE offers no asylum status for the religiously persecuted. Êzîdîs are present as guest workers, may practise their religion only privately.

Sources

UAE Constitution Art. 32
USCIRF UAE 2024
Human Rights Watch UAE Reports

Global summary

Top 5 countries with the best conditions for Êzîdîs

Armenia: fully recognised, constitutional protection, largest temple worldwide (Aknalich)
Germany: largest diaspora worldwide (250,000+), Bundestag genocide recognition, special quotas, KdöR application pending
Canada: Operation Ezra, 1,200+ survivors programme, parliamentary genocide recognition
Sweden: Riksdag recognition 2023, 20,000+ community, own associations
Australia: Census recording 4,123+, Armidale integration programme

Top 5 countries with the worst conditions for Êzîdîs

Turkey: no recognition, Diyanet textbooks stigmatise, de-facto expulsion complete
Iran: constitution recognises only 3 religions (Êzîdîs not), apostasy pressure, no temples
Azerbaijan: registration-hostile, Êzîdîs de facto invisible
Syria (Afrîn under SNA control): ongoing assaults, temples destroyed, land expropriation
Israel: symbolically interesting: explicitly REJECTED to recognise the 2014 genocide

Current hotspots of persecution

Şingal/Sinjar (Iraq): Turkish drone strikes, KDP-PMU front line, 2,700+ missing
Afrîn (Syria): SNA assaults, temple destruction, land expropriation
Turkey (southeastern Anatolia): structural discrimination, no protection for the 365 remaining
Iran (Urmia region): apostasy pressure, no official recognition
Hesekê region (NE Syria): Daesh sleeper cells, Turkish pressure on AANES

Global outlook

Realistic: the diaspora in Germany/Canada/Sweden will, in the coming decades, constitute the demographic majority of living Êzîdîs, the heartland ratio is tipping. Şingal remains a divided, militarised territory without sustainable return.

Worrying: Turkey escalation, Iran-Israel conflict spillover, KDP appropriation of identity, language loss in the 3rd diaspora generation, Daesh resurgence in regional gaps.

Optimistic: academisation progresses (Göttingen 2024, Berlin Forum 2024). International prosecution is effective (Frankfurt, Paris, Brussels, The Hague, Munich). Quba Mêrê Dîwan in Armenia becomes a global pilgrimage destination. ZÊD structures network the diaspora.

Source density

In total referenced: ~120 independent sources across all countries. Average per country: 6–8 sources. Mandatory countries (heartland + heavy-diaspora): 8–12 sources per country. Smaller countries (Brazil, Spain, Japan, UAE): 3–5 sources.

Open research gaps

Êzîdî population in Iran is statistically almost entirely undocumented
Azerbaijan Census 2009 with 7 persons is obviously not reliable
Russia Census 2021 data on Êzîdîs not yet published in full granularity
Japan, China (Xinjiang region): no valid estimates
Levant (Lebanon, Jordan): small transit populations not recorded
Mexico, Central America: Êzîdî presence unconfirmed
Africa (South Africa, Egypt, Sudan): individual families documented, but no studies
Latin America: poorly researched overall

Methodological notes

This document follows the practice of using at least two independent sources per statement wherever possible. For victim figures, all existing estimates are named (Yazda, UN, IOM, KRG, Baghdad). For populations, official census data and NGO estimates are given in parallel.

Politically honest: this wiki names KDP appropriation policy, Turkish expulsion, Iranian constitutional discrimination and Israeli genocide rejection for what they are, without diplomatic trivialisation. Likewise, positive policy contributions (Germany 2023, Armenia 2018, Canada 2016, Sweden 2023) are clearly acknowledged.

Êzîdî authenticity: proper names are given in Êzîdî transliteration (Kurmanji): Şingal, Şêxan, Lalîş, Bahzanî, Behzane. Local names (e.g. “Êzîdîstan” for the heartland region) are carried along. Sirr taboos are observed, the inner core of the Heft Sirran is not elaborated.

Last updated: 2026-05-22 Maintenance: this wiki should be updated at least every six months. Critical events (e.g. new genocide recognitions, escalations in Şingal, KDP-Baghdad conflicts) should be added immediately.

The Yazidi (Female) Survivors Law 2021 in Detail

The “Yazidi Female Survivors’ Law” (Arabic قانون الناجيات الإيزيديات, Law No. 8/2021, passed by the Iraqi parliament on 1 March 2021) is the first comprehensive state reparations law for survivors of a genocide in the history of Iraq. It is also regarded as the world’s first law to establish a permanent, individual compensation regime specifically for survivors of conflict-related sexual violence, rather than only one-time humanitarian emergency relief.

Beneficiaries (Art. 1–2): The law covers not only Yazidi women and girls who, since 3 August 2014, were enslaved, sexually enslaved, forcibly married, or forced into abortions by ISIS, but also explicitly (a) Yazidi children who were abducted before reaching the age of 18, (b) survivors of mass killings, and © women and girls of the Turkmen, Christian, and Shabak minorities who suffered comparable ISIS crimes. The law explicitly names the ISIS crimes as genocide and crimes against humanity.

Reparation benefits (Art. 5–6): Provided for are (1) a lifelong monthly pension of at least double the minimum pension under the Unified Pension Law No. 9/2014; (2) a residential plot of land with a real estate loan or, alternatively, a free housing unit; (3) a 2% quota in the allocation of public-sector positions; (4) re-entry into school and university with exemption from age limits; (5) access to psychosocial and medical rehabilitation in centers to be specially established. The law also obliges the government to declare 3 August a national day of remembrance and to advance the search for the missing.

Institution (Art. 3): Responsibility lies with the newly created General Directorate of Survivors’ Affairs (GDSA) at the Iraqi Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, based in Nineveh Province. It administers the application process, which went online in September 2022 with support from the IOM (International Organization for Migration) and funding from the Netherlands, Germany, Australia, the United Kingdom, and USAID.

State of implementation: Implementation is slow and contentious. The first concrete benefits flowed only on 1 March 2023 (the second anniversary), when 24 survivors (21 women, 3 men) received the first debit cards (MasterCard) for the pension payment; entitlements were calculated retroactively from June 2022. By February 2024, the Iraqi government reported that it had approved 1,651 survivors for payments (847 women, 784 as minors who had been abducted, 20 survivors of mass killings). In the course of further developments, more than 2,000 applications were approved, but actual payments reached a significantly smaller group. The monthly pension is progressing, while the remaining components (land/housing, health centers, educational support) remained largely unrealized up to 2025 (C4JR “More than Ink on Paper”, 4-year monitoring 2025).

Structural gaps and criticism: NGOs (Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Yazda, Free Yezidi Foundation, Coalition for Just Reparations) criticize several serious obstacles: (1) Since September 2022, the commission established under Art. 10 has required that every applicant first file a criminal complaint against ISIS in Iraq and submit the investigation file—a retraumatizing condition that is barely achievable for survivors living abroad (above all in Germany, France, Australia, Canada); only since November 2024 has remote witness testimony at Iraqi consular missions in Berlin, Frankfurt, and Paris been possible. (2) Bureaucratic obstacles such as DNA tests and witnesses. (3) Above all: the law excludes entirely the children born of ISIS rape and provides no solution whatsoever for them. Since Iraqi personal status law registers such children as Muslims and the Yazidi community traditionally does not accept them, the law effectively forces many mothers to choose between their child and a return to the community, which is why some women forgo an application altogether (Just Security “No Way Home”, 2024).

Kommentare

Noch keine Kommentare — sei der Erste.

🖼 Images

Table of contents

1. Iraq (Êzîdî heartland: Şingal, Şêxan, Bahzanî, Behzane)

Historical Êzîdî presence

Current status of rights

Target state

Timeline

Persecution + oppression

Government policy

Outlook

Sources

2. Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRG): special case

Historical Êzîdî presence

Current status of rights

Target state

Timeline

Persecution + oppression

Government policy

Outlook

Sources

3. Syria (Afrîn, Hesekê, Qamişlo)

Historical Êzîdî presence

Current status of rights

Target state

Timeline

Persecution + oppression

Government policy

Outlook

Sources

4. Turkey (Mêrdîn, Diyarbakır, Batman, Bacın)

Historical Êzîdî presence

Current status of rights

Target state

Timeline

Persecution + oppression

Government policy

Outlook

Sources

5. Iran (Urmia region, Maku, Choi)

Historical Êzîdî presence

Current status of rights

Target state

Timeline

Persecution + oppression

Government policy

Outlook

Sources

6. Armenia (Aparan, Alagyaz, Yerevan)

Historical Êzîdî presence

Current status of rights

Target state

Timeline

Persecution + oppression

Government policy

Outlook

Sources

7. Georgia (Tbilisi, Telavi)

Historical Êzîdî presence

Current status of rights

Target state

Timeline

Persecution + oppression

Government policy

Outlook

Sources

8. Russia (Krasnodar, Stavropol, Moscow, Saratov)

Historical Êzîdî presence

Current status of rights

Target state

Timeline

Persecution + oppression

Government policy

Outlook

Sources

9. Azerbaijan

Historical Êzîdî presence

Current status of rights

Target state

Timeline

Persecution + oppression