Şingal (Sinjar): Region, History and Present

Status: 2026-06. This article covers the Şingal region as a whole: geography, religious significance, history before 2014 and the situation today. The genocide of 2014 is deliberately presented here only in overview, in detail in the articles Genocides against the Êzîdîs, Ferman Chronicle and in the Timeline. Methodology: All figures are given with source and reference date; where figures diverge, ranges are stated. Statements about security actors are strictly attributed to their respective sources.

Introduction

Şingal (Sinjar) is the demographic and cultural heartland of the Êzîdîs worldwide. The region in northwestern Iraq, named after the mountain range Çiyayê Şingalê (Kurmancî: “Mountain of Şingal”), was, before August 2014, the largest contiguous Êzîdî settlement region in the world. The mountain is sacred to the Êzîdîs: according to local tradition, Noah’s Ark came to rest here after the Flood, and for centuries it served as a place of refuge during persecutions, most recently in August 2014, when tens of thousands of people fled to the mountain from the so-called “Islamic State” (IS).

Administratively, Şingal is a district of the Iraqi governorate of Nineveh and at the same time belongs to the “disputed territories” between Baghdad and Erbil, an unresolved status that has shaped the region for decades. Today, more than a decade after the genocide of 2014, Şingal is a region between reconstruction and standstill: about half of the displaced population has returned, hundreds of thousands continue to live in displacement, and the political future of the district remains open.

Geography and Places

The Mountain Range

The Şingal mountains are a roughly 100-kilometre-long mountain range running from east to west, rising strikingly out of the surrounding steppe plain of Upper Mesopotamia. The highest point lies at 1,463 metres. About 75 kilometres of the range lie in the Iraqi governorate of Nineveh, around 25 kilometres on Syrian territory. Geologically, it is a breached anticline of limestone and sandstone, whose strata range from the Upper Cretaceous to the early Neogene [1].

Since about the 12th century, the region around the mountain has been predominantly Êzîdî-settled [1][2]. The location of the mountain range, away from the great centres of power, difficult to access, on the border between empires and later between states, has deeply shaped the history of the region and its inhabitants.

Administration and Places

Şingal is a district (qeza, Kurmancî/Arabic: administrative district) of the Nineveh governorate. The district capital is the town of Şingal on the southern flank of the mountain [3]. Other important places are:

• Sinunê in the north of the mountain, centre of the northern side
• Xanesor (Khanasor) in the northwest
• Til Ezêr (Arabic: al-Qahtaniyya) and Siba Şêx Xidir (Arabic: al-Jazira) in the plain south of the mountain, both places were the target of the deadliest bomb attacks of the Iraq War in 2007 (see below)
• Koço (Kocho) on the southern plateau, the site of the massacre of 15 August 2014, to which a separate section in the genocide article (in depth: Genocide 2014) is dedicated

Many of the places in the plain are not organically grown villages but collective settlements from the era of the Baath dictatorship (see section “Arabisation Policy”) [3][4].

Population

Reliable population figures for Şingal do not exist, the last Iraqi census took place in 1997, and all more recent figures are estimates. For the town of Şingal, about 88,000 inhabitants were estimated in 2013, the majority of them Êzîdîs, alongside Sunni and Shia Arabs, Turkmens and Assyrians [3]. For the Êzîdî population of the whole region before August 2014, depending on the source, about 400,000 to 480,000 people are given [2][3][4]. In August 2014, around 400,000 people were displaced within a few hours; to this day only a part of them has returned (see section “The Situation Today”) [4].

Religious Significance: The Holy Mountain

For the Êzîdîs, the Çiyayê Şingalê is far more than a mountain range, it is a holy place, a space of protection and a bearer of the religious landscape. According to local tradition, Noah’s Ark is said to have come to rest on the highest peak of the mountain after the Flood [1]. Scattered across the whole mountain lie sanctuaries and mausoleums with the characteristic fluted conical roofs, which in Êzîdî architecture symbolise the rays of the sun (in detail in the article Architecture of the Sanctuaries).

Şerfedîn (Perestgeha Şerfedîn)

The most important sanctuary of the region is the Perestgeha Şerfedîn (Kurmancî: “Sanctuary of Şerfedîn”) on the northern side of the mountain, dedicated to Şêx Şerfedîn (Şeref ed-Dîn ibn Şêx Hesen). The Êzîdîs regard it as one of the holiest places of all; the founding inscription names the year 1274 CE [5][6]. The structure of light-coloured stone with a fluted conical roof is one of the oldest continuously used Êzîdî sanctuaries.

Şerfedîn also has an identity-forming dimension for the Êzîdîs of Şingal: some Şingal Êzîdîs even use “Şerfedîn” as a self-designation of their religion [5]. In August 2014, a small group of about 18 lightly armed Êzîdî fighters under Qasim Şeşo successfully defended the sanctuary against a larger IS unit equipped with armoured vehicles and mortars, Şerfedîn was never captured and thus became a powerful symbol of the will to survive [5].

Şerfedîn is also a place of pilgrimage. According to widespread accounts, the main annual pilgrimage takes place in mid-August; however, the exact date is not uniformly established in the accessible sources and should be enquired about locally or with the community [5][7]. Among the traditional pilgrimage customs are stacking three black stones at the tomb (as a sign of good fortune) and knotting colourful pieces of cloth to the wall (for the fulfilment of a wish) [5].

Çil Mêra and Other Sanctuaries

On the highest peak of the mountain lies the sanctuary Çil Mêra (also Çermêra; Kurmancî: “Forty Men”). Little about its history is documented in the accessible literature; the common interpretation of the name refers to forty men to whom the place is said to be dedicated [1][8].

In addition, numerous other mausoleums with conical roofs are documented on the mountain, among them Şêx Amadîn on the summit of Galê Bîrîn (inscription of 1400), Şêx Hesen in the village of Gabbara (inscription of 1325) as well as Hajalî / Pîr Hecî Alî (Hassina) and Memê Reş (Tappa), both of which probably date back to the 12th century [6]. Some mausoleums in Şingal were destroyed by IS in 2014/15 [6].

The Tradition of the Protecting Mountain

Perhaps the most important layer of meaning of the mountain is its role as a refuge. For centuries, the Êzîdîs fled to the mountain during persecutions, the Fermans (Kurmancî/Ottoman: literally “decree”; in Êzîdî memory the term for the great campaigns of persecution and annihilation, see Ferman Chronicle), whose altitude and inaccessibility offered protection. This tradition continued into recent history: in August 2014, 40,000 to 50,000 people fled to the mountain from IS [1][9]. “The mountain as protector” remains a central motif in the self-understanding of the Şingal Êzîdîs to this day.

History before 2014

Antiquity and Early Period

The area around Şingal already appears in ancient Mesopotamian sources under the name “Saggar”. From the 2nd century CE, the town was a Roman military outpost known as Singara and lay for centuries in the border zone of competing empires, Assyrians, Romans, Persians, later Ottomans. After the Arab conquest in the 630s/640s, the region belonged to the province of al-Jazira [1][3].

Ottoman Era: Bastion of Resistance

In 1534, the Ottomans conquered Şingal; the region became the centre of its own sanjak (Ottoman administrative district) in the Eyalet of Diyarbekir [3]. From the 17th century onwards, Şingal was regarded as the main bastion of Êzîdî resistance against the Ottoman central power: the mountain population refused conscription (forced recruitment) and special taxes, to which the empire responded with repeated punitive expeditions [3][10].

The Fermans of the 19th Century

The 19th century brought two of the most devastating waves of persecution (in detail in the Ferman Chronicle):

• 1832–1834: The Kurdish prince Mîrê Kor (Muhammad Pasha of Rawanduz) carried out, simultaneously with the campaigns of Bedir Khan Beg, massacres of the Êzîdîs in Şêxan and Şingal. The transmitted casualty figures vary greatly; estimates reach up to 70,000 dead, and some traditions cite even higher numbers. Many of those fleeing drowned in the Tigris [4][11].
• 1892/93: The Ottoman general Omer Wehbi Pasha moved against Şêxan and Şingal with the demand of forced conversion or special taxes under threat of death. At Mount Şingal he was repelled; the Sultan dismissed him in December 1892 [11].

In Êzîdî memorial culture, these events are counted in the tradition of the 72 (or 74) Fermans. The number 72 is to be understood symbolically, it stands for “very many”, and the genocide of 2014 is often counted as the 73rd or 74th Ferman [4][11].

The Iraqi State Era

Under the Iraqi state founded in 1921, too, Şingal remained a place of conflict with the central power: in 1935 the Iraqi army attacked eleven Êzîdî villages and imposed martial law on the region after the population had resisted military conscription [11].

Arabisation Policy and Collective Settlements

A rupture whose effects last to this day was the Arabisation policy of the Baath Party. From the late 1960s and through the 1970s, in the course of Arabisation and “de-Kurdification”, over 400 villages were destroyed in Şingal alone. The population was forcibly resettled into eleven newly built collective settlements (mucamma’at, Arabic: “collective settlements”) in the plain around the mountain. The settlements were given Arabic names, and Êzîdî land was transferred to Arab settlers [4][11].

The consequences of this policy reach into the present: the forced resettlement created a vulnerable settlement geometry in the open plain, places such as Koço, Til Ezêr and Siba Şêx Xidir are such plain settlements, whose location in 2014 made flight to the mountain more difficult. In addition, there are land-rights conflicts that remain unresolved to this day [4][11].

Article 140: Şingal as a “Disputed Territory”

Şingal is one of the roughly 14 disputed territories between the Iraqi federal government in Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Erbil. Article 140 of the Iraqi constitution of 2005 provided a three-stage procedure for these territories, normalisation, census, referendum, which was to be completed by the end of 2007. It was never implemented. The Federal Supreme Court of Iraq confirmed in 2019 that Article 140 remains in force [12][13][14].

The practical consequence for Şingal: decades of neglect in investment and administration, competing loyalties and, aggravated since 2014, parallel administrative structures. The unresolved status is one of the roots of almost all of the region’s present-day problems (on the overall situation of the Êzîdîs in Iraq, see Political Situation Worldwide).

The Attacks of 14 August 2007

On 14 August 2007, four coordinated truck bombs carrying several tonnes of explosives in total destroyed large parts of the Êzîdî towns of Til Ezêr (al-Qahtaniyya) and Siba Şêx Xidir (al-Jazira). With about 796 dead and around 1,500 injured, it was the deadliest bomb attack of the Iraq War; al-Qaeda in Iraq is considered the main suspect [15][16]. In the Ferman counting of some Êzîdîs, this attack is remembered as a Ferman of its own, seven years before 2014, it made the defencelessness of the Êzîdîs in the plain visible in a harrowing way.

The Ferman of 2014: Brief Overview

On 3 August 2014, IS attacked the Şingal region and committed a genocide against the Êzîdîs. Since this event has its own detailed articles on ezdixan.de, only the key facts for context are given here:

• Around 400,000 people were displaced within hours [4]
• 40,000 to 50,000 people were trapped on the mountain [1][9]
• The town of Şingal was liberated on 13 November 2015 [3]
• In the town of Şingal, according to the Dutch NIOD Institute, about 80% of the infrastructure and 70% of the houses were destroyed [4]

→ Detailed account: Genocides against the Êzîdîs · Ferman Chronicle · Timeline

The Situation Today

Return and Displacement

More than a decade after the genocide, return to Şingal has succeeded only in part, the figures differ considerably depending on source, reference date and counting method, and are therefore given here with source and date:

• NIOD (2024): 80,000–120,000 returnees to Şingal [4]
• IOM-DTM Return Index, Round 23 (September–December 2024): return rate in the Şingal district about 50%: the lowest figure nationwide (Iraq overall: 83%). In the same period, however, over 18,000 people returned, the largest wave of returns in years, driven by the closure of camps and the increase of the state return assistance from 1.5 to 4 million Iraqi dinars [17][18]
• KirkukNow (September 2023): over 26,000 families in 16 camps in Duhok province, plus over 38,000 families outside camps. Notably: over 1,000 families even returned from Şingal back to the camps: the report cites unemployment, lack of electricity, water and health care as well as destroyed houses as reasons [19]
• More recent figures (2024/25), depending on definition and counting method, cite between roughly 200,000 and 300,000 still-displaced Şingalis in and around Duhok; the figures diverge because in some cases only camp residents, in others all displaced persons, in others only Êzîdîs are counted [4][19][20]

Reconstruction

Reconstruction is progressing only slowly. The destruction of 2014/15 (according to NIOD, ca. 80% of the infrastructure of the town of Şingal [4]) has not been repaired in many places; electricity and water networks, schools and health facilities are lacking. Aid organisations such as the IOM support returnee families in a targeted way, for example in rebuilding houses [20], but the need far exceeds the means. The unresolved administrative status (see Article 140) additionally blocks larger state investments.

The Sinjar Agreement of 2020 and Its Failure

On 9/10 October 2020, the Iraqi federal government and the KRG, mediated by the UN mission UNAMI, concluded the so-called Sinjar Agreement with three pillars [21]:

1. Administration: a new, consensually appointed independent mayor, not appointed to this day; two competing administrations continue to exist, one on the ground and one in exile in Duhok
2. Security: withdrawal of all “armed formations”, explicitly the PKK, as well as the build-up of 2,500 local security forces (1,500 positions for returning internally displaced persons, 1,000 for local residents)
3. Reconstruction: a joint committee of Baghdad and Erbil

According to the concurring assessment of observers, the greatest design flaw: the Êzîdîs on the ground were not consulted in the negotiations [21][22][23]. Implementation has largely failed to this day; the UN, the USA and the US Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) regularly call for it [21][22][23].

Security Situation

In Şingal, several armed structures compete, a situation that affects the Êzîdî civilian population most strongly in everyday life, as it stands between the claims of the various actors. The following account reflects the assessments of the cited sources:

• the Iraqi army and federal police;
• brigades of the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF / Haşd al-Şabi): according to the Atlantic Council (2021), around 15,000 PMF forces were moved into the area [21];
• the Êzîdî Şingal Resistance Units (YBŞ) with about 1,500 fighters, formed in 2014/15 with the help of the PKK, according to the International Crisis Group and Chatham House ideologically close to the PKK, but administratively and financially assigned to the PMF [21][22][23];
• local structures of a PKK-inspired self-administration (Democratic Autonomous Council of Şingal) [22];
• the KDP Peshmerga withdrew from Şingal in October 2017 [21].

Turkish airstrikes: Because of the PKK presence, Turkey has repeatedly flown air and drone strikes on Şingal since 2017; the research organisation ICSVE documented the strikes of the years 2017–2021 [24]. A documented example: on 16/17 August 2021, a strike hit a vehicle in the town of Şingal (among the dead the YBŞ commander Seîd Hesen) as well as the clinic in the village of Sikêniyê, according to Middle East Eye and other media, eight people died, including clinic staff and a civilian [25]. According to The New Humanitarian (February 2022), fear of airstrikes measurably slowed the return of displaced persons [26]. The Turkish government, by its own account, regards the presence of the PKK and YBŞ as a security threat and made the withdrawal of the PKK a condition for de-escalation [24][26].

Developments since 2024: Cautious De-escalation

Since 2024, a possible turning point has been emerging, the situation is dynamic, however, and the following information reflects the status of the cited sources: according to the Jamestown Foundation, no Turkish airstrikes in Şingal have been reported since July 2024. In October 2024, a Turkish-Kurdish peace process began; in February 2025, the imprisoned PKK founder Abdullah Öcalan called for the dissolution of the PKK, followed in May/July 2025 by corresponding dissolution and disarmament declarations [27][28]. Observers see in this opportunities for more returns, at the same time, central questions remain open: the status of the YBŞ is unresolved (in the Iraqi parliament there are proposals to integrate them into state security structures [29]), and the fundamental conflicts over administration and Article 140 are unresolved [27][28].

Culture and Economy

“Land of Figs”: Agriculture

The economic basis of Şingal is agriculture: wheat, barley, tobacco, pomegranates, olives, vegetables, and above all figs, for which the region is known far beyond Iraq. Şingal has more than 40,000 hectares of agricultural land, mostly rain-fed, and about 50,000 fig trees, of which around 40,000 are in the Sinunê area. In the mountain-terrace villages such as Karsî, Gabara and Dereji, fig cultivation has a long tradition; Şingal figs fetch 3,000 to 5,000 Iraqi dinars per kilogram on the markets [30].

Double Crisis: Destruction and Drought

Şingal’s agriculture is under double pressure. On the one hand, IS deliberately destroyed orchards, wells and irrigation systems, Amnesty International spoke in 2018 of “wanton destruction” of Êzîdî farmland [31]. On the other hand, drought and climate change are taking their toll on the region: the fig harvest in the Sinunê area halved from 150 tonnes (2019) to 75 tonnes (2021); in 2023, around 4,000 trees withered at temperatures above 40 °C. From the mountain village of Karsî alone, about 130 families moved away [30]. As a counter-movement, among other things, a reforestation project with the goal of one million trees was launched, in a single monthly batch, 7,000 fig cuttings were planted [30][32].

Festivals and Religious Life

The religious year of the Şingal Êzîdîs combines local and supra-regional traditions (in detail in the festival calendar article on ezdixan.de):

• the pilgrimage to Şerfedîn (see above; the exact date should be enquired about with the community) [5][7]
• the great autumn pilgrimage Cejna Cemayê (Kurmancî: “Feast of the Assembly”) to Lalîş from 6 to 13 October, to which Şingal Êzîdîs also make pilgrimage [7]
• Çarşema Sor / Serê Salê (Kurmancî: the Êzîdî New Year festival on the first Wednesday in April according to the Eastern calendar) [7]
• Cejna Êzî (Kurmancî: “Feast of Êzî”) on the Friday before the winter solstice, which in Şingal is celebrated with particular intensity after the three-day fast Rojiyên Êzî [33]

Identity and Significance for the Diaspora

Şingal is regarded as the demographic and cultural heartland of the Êzîdîs worldwide, before 2014 it was the largest contiguous Êzîdî settlement region. Because of the centuries-long seclusion of the mountain country, Şingal is moreover frequently described as a preserver of distinct oral traditions [2][10]. For the diaspora now scattered across the world, from Germany to Australia (see Political Situation Worldwide), the mountain remains a central reference point of identity: as a holy place, as the place of the ancestors and as a reminder that the survival of the community was never a matter of course.

Sources

All sources retrieved on 11 June 2026.

1. Wikipedia: Sinjar Mountains, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sinjar_Mountains
2. The Kurdish Project: Sinjar (Shingal), https://thekurdishproject.org/kurdistan-map/iraqi-kurdistan/sinjar-shingal/
3. Wikipedia: Sinjar, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sinjar
4. NIOD Institut für Kriegs-, Holocaust- und Genozidstudien (NL): „Ten years of ongoing genocide against the Yazidis", https://www.niod.nl/en/longreads/ten-years-ongoing-genocide-against-yazidis
5. Wikipedia: Sharfadin Temple, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sharfadin_Temple
6. Mesopotamia Heritage: The Yazidi mausoleums of Sinjar, https://www.mesopotamiaheritage.org/en/monuments/les-mausolees-yezidis-de-sinjar/
7. Wikipedia: Cejna Cemayê, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cejna_Cemayê
8. Wikivoyage: Sinjar, https://en.wikivoyage.org/wiki/Sinjar
9. PLOS Medicine: Mortality and kidnapping estimates for the Yazidi population … Mount Sinjar, August 2014, https://journals.plos.org/plosmedicine/article?id=10.1371/journal.pmed.1002297
10. irqnow: A brief history of Sinjar, https://irqnow.com/sinjar/
11. Wikipedia: Persecution of Yazidis, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Persecution_of_Yazidis
12. Wikipedia: Article 140 of the Constitution of Iraq, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Article_140_of_the_Constitution_of_Iraq
13. KirkukNow: Article 140, disputed territories, https://kirkuknow.com/en/news/69161
14. Rudaw: Territories remain disputed, Article 140 can be implemented, Iraqi federal court (2019), https://www.rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/300720192
15. Wikipedia: 2007 Yazidi communities bombings, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2007_Yazidi_communities_bombings
16. UN News: UN Iraq envoy reviews reconstruction options for bomb-devastated Sinjar region (2007), https://news.un.org/en/story/2007/09/231602
17. IOM DTM Iraq: Master List Report 134 (Sep–Dez 2024), https://iraqdtm.iom.int/images/MasterList/20253231141635_IOM_DTM_ML_134.pdf
18. IOM DTM Iraq: Sinjar District Factsheet, https://iraqdtm.iom.int/files/HHReintegration/2024611222618_IOM_DTM_Sinjar_ factsheet_v14.pdf
19. KirkukNow: Shingal (Sinjar) returnees back to IDP camps (24.09.2023), https://www.kirkuknow.com/en/news/69664
20. 964media: Dozens of Yazidi families return to Sinjar with IOM support (12.03.2024), https://en.964media.com/15833/
21. Atlantic Council: The Sinjar agreement has good ideas, but is it a dead end? (2021), https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/the-sinjar-agreement-has-good-ideas-but-is-it-a-dead-end/
22. International Crisis Group: Iraq, Stabilising the Contested District of Sinjar, Report 235 (31.05.2022), https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/iraq/iraq-stabilising-contested-district-sinjar
23. USIP: The Struggle for Sinjar, Iraqis’ Views on Security in the Disputed District (2021), https://www.usip.org/publications/2021/04/struggle-sinjar-iraqis-views-security-disputed-district
24. ICSVE: Five Years of Airstrikes, Turkish Aggression and International Silence in Sinjar, 2017–2021, https://icsve.org/five-years-of-airstrikes-turkish-aggression-and-international-silence-in-sinjar-2017-2021/
25. Middle East Eye: Iraq, Three dead after Turkish strike on clinic in Sinjar (08/2021), https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/iraq-three-dead-after-turkish-air-strike-clinic-sinjar
26. The New Humanitarian: In Iraq’s Sinjar, Yazidi returns crawl to a halt amid fears of Turkish airstrikes (10.02.2022), https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2022/2/10/Iraq-Sinjar-Yazidi-returns-halt-Turkish-airstrikes
27. Jamestown Foundation: Impact of Turkish-PKK Peace Process on Iraqi Yezidis (2025), https://jamestown.org/impact-of-turkish-pkk-peace-process-on-iraqi-yezidis/
28. The New Region: PKK disarmament sparks hope for Sinjar return, but deep challenges persist (2025), https://thenewregion.com/posts/2719/pkk-disarmament-sparks-hope-for-sinjar-return-but-deep-challenges-persist
29. Shafaq News: Iraqi Yazidi MP proposes integrating YBS into state security institutions, https://shafaq.com/en/Kurdistan/Iraqi-Yazidi-MP-proposes-integrating-YBS-into-state-security-institutions
30. KirkukNow: Shingal (Sinjar), From Land of figs to Desert by Drought, https://kirkuknow.com/en/news/70554
31. Amnesty International: Iraq, Islamic State’s destructive legacy decimates Yezidi farming (12/2018), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2018/12/iraq-islamic-states-destructive-legacy-decimates-yezidi-farming/
32. ReliefWeb: Working with the farmers of Sinjar, https://reliefweb.int/report/iraq/working-farmers-sinjar
33. Wikipedia: Feast of Ezid, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Feast_of_Ezid

Persistent Internal Displacement: Camp Life as a Permanent Condition

More than a decade after 2014, displacement has become a chronic rather than a temporary condition for a large portion of the Şingal Yazidis. The bulk of the internally displaced persons (IDPs) is concentrated in Duhok Province in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, where numerous Yazidis have lived for years in camps such as Şarya (Sharya), Xanik (Khanke), Bajid Kandala, and Domiz. Estimates consistently put the number of people still displaced at the end of 2024 at roughly 190,000 to over 200,000, a large share of whom live in camps [34][35].

Specifically, the Geneva refugee-aid sphere reports around 155,000 to 157,000 camp residents in 23 camps in the Kurdistan Region for 2024, predominantly Yazidis from Şingal [36][37]. The largest Yazidi camp, Şarya near Duhok, alone houses over 12,000 people [38]. The tent camps, originally erected as a temporary measure, have become permanent places of residence for many; an entire generation of Yazidi children has known no life outside the camp. A 2023 survey conducted by UNHCR found that about 60% of camp residents had no plans to return; the reasons cited were destroyed homes, uncleared landmines, and the ongoing insecurity [36].